Doug Birkey: [00:00:00] Welcome to the Aerospace Advantage podcast
brought to you by PenFed. I’m Doug Birkey, executive director at Mitchell
Institute. Here on the Aerospace Advantage, we speak with leaders in DoD,
industry, and other subject matter experts to explore the intersection of strategy,
operational concepts, technology, and policy when it comes to air and space
power.
This week, we’re going to focus on key considerations the incoming Trump
defense team, especially the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air
Force, should be thinking about when it comes to air power. Now, we focused
on space power last week, so this week we’re going to dig into priority issues
that need attention when it comes to the air domain.
Now, while some of our observations may be new, others have been on the table
for way too long and need attention now. I mean, think about it. It was the last
decade when Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson declared, the Air Force
is too small for what the nation expects of us. Since then, the service has gotten
even smaller, older, and less ready as the world that’s gotten way more
dangerous. I mean, since she uttered those words, Russia invaded Ukraine,
[00:01:00] Iran went on a rampage in the Middle East, and China, it’s
continuing to press hard in the Pacific. And the homeland is under threat in very
new and dangerous ways, and we really haven’t had to think about that since the
Cold War.
And so we’re in a zone right now where it’s make or break. And I think we’ve
got to emphasize the Air Force’s role in it and why it must reset to deal with the
challenges that exist in the world that’s out there right now. So with that, I’m
excited to have General Deptula, General Stutzriem, Mark Gunzinger, J. V.
Venable, all from our team here to cover the issues. So with that, gentlemen,
welcome.
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Hey, great to be here as always, Doug.
Maj. Gen. Larry “Stutz” Stutzriem, USAF (Ret.): Hey, thanks, Doug.
Mark “Gonzo” Gunzinger: Hello, everybody.
John “JV” Venable: Absolutely. A pleasure, Doug. Thanks for having me.
Doug Birkey: So General Stutzriem help set the stage for us. What kind of
world are we asking airmen to address when they take to the sky these days?
Maj. Gen. Larry “Stutz” Stutzriem, USAF (Ret.): Well, let’s take a spin
around a very complex threat environment and our airmen face some real
challenges. As I talk about this, put it in the context of, are [00:02:00] we
adequately deterring what our airmen are going to encounter? First, you’ve got
the Russian invasion of Ukraine and that’s really put Europe back on the map.
It’s a theater we can’t ignore.
We know that, the collapse of Afghanistan and, the choices that Putin made to
invade Ukraine, probably, because we telegraphed the lack of resolve. But we
now have also seen the resurrection of this threat of nuclear war. And, uh, you
know, we’ve had these, comments made by the Russians, at the very top of their
leadership.
And it could be that they are willing to break, you know, a nuclear taboo that
was established after the last use to nuclear weapons in 1945. And then let’s go a
little further, to China and, you know, what can we say there? They’ve declared
the intent to change the world order. They’re right now in the middle of a huge
buildup of their defenses that [00:03:00] are primarily aimed at projecting force
throughout the, uh, region.
But, engineered, especially the air defenses, engineered to counter the one
remaining asymmetric advantage the United States has, which is its air power.
They’re also, building a, fairly sizable nuclear capability. Then we look at the
Middle East. It’s really more unstable than ever. And if we look at the recent
seven front attack on Israel, which came out of nowhere, knowing that they
were only prepared to sustain, you know, a couple of months of combat. And
this is this went on for over a year. The carnage is great and there’s been some
amazing things, to see the airmen defend against What in other areas of the
world is considered impossible, which is defending airbases.
And we now know that Israeli airbases were not closed because of air and
missile attack by both drones and ballistic missiles by Iran. And then of course
we saw [00:04:00] the Israelis, their air power really put Iran’s defenses back.
But, Iran is working hard as we speak today to set their tentacles across the
Middle East.
So, they are not gone. we need to understand that they’ll still be working against
the West. North Korea, of course, remains very dangerous, and they are also
committed to their nuclear program and their ballistic missiles. And they are
increasingly aligned with Russia and China, which is another dimension of this
threat preview or review, uh, in that there is increasing collaboration, to various
levels among these threats.
Now there’s a number of non state actors and airmen are going to get involved
in a lot of that. Whether it’s in the Middle East, Africa, or in the Western
Hemisphere, don’t forget cartels, transnational crime. This is nesting more than
ever in proximity and in the homeland, and we don’t have a lot [00:05:00] of
people helping us in the Western Hemisphere, especially Mexico, in terms of
trying to control that threat.
And then, Doug, as you know, we’ve talked a lot about the vulnerability of the
homeland. You know, we’ve got Russia building bases up in the Arctic again, a
new regime of stealthy cruise missiles and we are vulnerable, extremely
vulnerable to air missile attack, uh, that originate in and through the Arctic.
And so airmen are going to be instrumental to both detecting and responding to
threats that may originate or come through the Arctic. And once again, I’ll, end
on this, that, there’s two dynamics. One is that there is truly a proliferation of
nuclear ambition, and that’s going to be all mixed into this, which makes it very
difficult.
And the second thing is, once again, as I said, the collaboration between these
threats.
Doug Birkey: Now, that’s unreal. And you think about it, the Cold War was
really challenging, but that was primarily against one major threat. [00:06:00]
You just reviewed the concurrency, and it’s not like you can really choose. I
mean, we’ve got to pay attention to Putin.
We’ve got to pay attention to China, Iran, North Korea. You said it, the
homeland. I mean, it’s asking for everything all the time, and yet we’re a fraction
of the size that we used to be. So, General Deptula, pulling that thread a little
bit, earlier this month, you addressed the state of the Air Force at an aerospace
conference up in New York City.
Given what Stutz just laid out, what were your key points in that context?
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Well Doug, obviously, I concur with
everything that, Stutz mentioned. I’d just reiterate that the, uh, threats that the U.
S. faces, are the most serious and most challenging that our nation’s faced in our
entire history. Not just since the end of World War II, in our entire history. And
include the very real potential For near term major war, perhaps with China, but
there is one thing that we’ve got a hundred percent batting average on, and that’s
predicting the next major regional conflict.[00:07:00]
So, conflict could very well.
Doug Birkey: And you mean we’ve been wrong every time, right?
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah, no one’s predicted the next
conflict that we’ll get involved with. So, it very well could be war with one of
the other countries that Stutz mentioned. Unfortunately, the Air Force has been
in a force structure and readiness nosedive that does not bode well for being
prepared for conflict inside the next 10 years, and perhaps beyond, depending
on the resourcing decisions made by the Trump administration’s Department of
Defense and Department of the Air Force new leadership.
While our combat inventory and readiness continues to decline, all the while
getting older all the time, the Chinese Air Force is the newest, the largest, and
the most ready in their history, and they’re getting better in each category.
President Trump has made it clear, we just heard him yesterday, that he believes
in the Reagan era approach of peace through strength. So, the first order
[00:08:00] of business in the new Trump administration at a macro level will be
to halt and then reverse the decline in the Air Force’s force structure. Second, to
halt and then reverse the decline in Air Force readiness. And then resource the
Space Force to meet the demands of the National Defense Strategy.
While we all address space more completely in a separate podcast, it’s important
to include it here because air and space are inextricably linked. Now, everyone,
I think most folks on this podcast, are very well aware of why the Air Force is
in the worst shape of all the services. We’re about the only people in
Washington who are aware of that fact.
And that’s part of the Air Force’s problem. Very few understand the decline that
it’s in. The bottom line is that the Air Force has been underfunded relative to the
departments of the Army and Navy for over three decades. [00:09:00]
Significantly underfunded to the point of neglect. In the 20 years post 9 11, the
Army received over 1.3 trillion dollars more than the Air Force, and that’s an
average of over 65 billion dollars a year more than the Navy received almost a
trillion dollars more.
Now one of the reasons nobody knows that is because there’s more than 45
billion dollars in the Air Force budget. That not one cent actually goes to the Air
Force, but because that pass through is in the Air Force budget, it appears to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American people that
the Air Force is actually the highest funded relative to the other services, when
in fact it’s not.
If you take that pass through out and put it where it belongs, the Air Force is
actually number four in funding, behind the Navy, Army, and other Department
of [00:10:00] Defense agencies. So, the next Air Force Secretary needs to be
committed to insisting on transparency in all Department of Defense funding so
that critical resource allocation decisions among the services can honestly be
made.
I’ve got an entire list of priority recommendations for Secretary designate Meink
to halt the Air Force’s decline, and I’m sure we’ll get to all of those before our
hour is out.
But his first order of business must be ensuring transparency in addressing
actual budget shares across all the services.
Doug Birkey: Now, I appreciate that. So, Gonzo, let’s focus a little bit on
solutions. Given what Stutz and Gen Deptula just laid out, what are the major
muscle movements that you’d want to see out of the Air Force to build up their
capabilities? I mean are there specific areas that would need to increase? How
do you see this reflected across the modernization plan for the service?
[00:11:00]
Mark “Gonzo” Gunzinger: Yeah, the short answer is the Air Force must
modernize and grow its forces for every mission area it’s responsible for,
including nuclear deterrence, air superiority, long range strike, ISR, command
and control, and of course, global mobility.
That’s the result of three decades of force cuts and delayed modernization
programs as well as inadequate budgets. The Air Force is now facing a
modernization bow wave that it cannot afford, given it remains the most
underfunded service in our military. And when I say underfunded, that’s from a
warfighting perspective, as well as a budget viewpoint.
Since the Air Force provides the air superiority, close air support, and of course
mobility, that are absolutely critical to the success of all U. S. operations. No
other military service, U. S. or ally can backfill what the Air Force brings to the
fight. There are no alternatives.
Air Force air superiority, long range strike, global mobility, that’s going to make
the difference [00:12:00] between a U. S. victory and early defeat in a fight with
China. And that’s based on operational assessments, decades of it, not rhetoric.
So, the new Air Force Secretary and Secretary should place their highest
priority on increasing the capability and capacity of those forces as rapidly as
possible.
So, for our listeners, imagine for a moment that you are the new Air Force
Secretary. I’m going to speak to you. Mr. Secretary, your service continues to
struggle to meet growing operational demands for airpower and simultaneously
modernize within its available budget. That’s why your airmen are suffering
from readiness rates that are historic lows and must operate combat aircraft that
have exceeded their planned service lives.
The fact is your service, you have the right requirements, but you can’t meet
them because of your limited resources.
Doug Birkey: Now, I really appreciate you digging into that. Stutz, I want to
pull a thread here [00:13:00] on what Gonzo is just saying on capacity. You
know, we really are ultra small at historic levels yet you gave us a laundry list
of all the areas we got to track concurrently.
What does that mean about scaling?
Maj. Gen. Larry “Stutz” Stutzriem, USAF (Ret.): Oh, well, let me begin by
saying, you know, cover this, first capacity matters and having advanced
technology capacity matters even more. So, what does it mean in terms of
military operations? First, capacity means you have staying power not to be
held hostage in one theater. And as I talked about the number of threats and
what General Deptula had said about those threats, it would be easy to be held
in a theater while somebody else somewhere else in the world takes advantage
of us.
Second, with capacity you can endure, and even if we think we have a technical
advantage, you know, quote, Smaller, but better, unquote. It doesn’t [00:14:00]
account for unexpected attrition we’re going to experience in high end conflicts,
say with China. There’s going to be fog and friction and at times things will
degrade until we adapt, and in those times, when we work to adapt, we need to
have the resources to continue to fight. The alternative would be to quit or
capitulate or surrender.
So what is the state of capacity? Let me give you a really simple analysis. And
this was done by a former commander of air combat command with respect to
fighter aircraft. He took, uh, the priorities, the demands of the national defense
strategy on a list, big, long list. He then applied the number of fighters required
to support that demand, and somewhere about a third of the way down the list,
he runs out of inventory. That’s an amazing, easy analysis to understand that
your Air Force only has a fraction of what the National Defense Strategy is
[00:15:00] tasking the Air Force to do.
Another, Doug, is bombers, and you know, this is our deep strike force. It holds
at risk the things most precious to China, Russia, Iran, and perhaps at the same
time. And we’ve got about 140 bombers, and we understand that at any one
time, we’re only going to get the engine started on about a third of those
bombers.
And these bombers are entirely ancient, non stealthy, almost all, and unable to
penetrate modern air defenses. Finally, I want to make the point that, especially
when you talk about the Pacific, one can add up the expected deployment of
fighters and bombers, but that doesn’t mean 100 strike aircraft can strike 100
targets a day. The vast distances of the Pacific mean your strike density is very
low.
For example, if you flew B 2s from Alaska or Australia, you might get one
sortie every two or three days. And these old bombers, they are [00:16:00] old.
They’re going to break a lot more. So we need to buy aircraft at scale. Capacity
matters. And we should be building to not a one war sizing approach, but two.
Doug Birkey: That is very compelling when you lay it out that way.
J. V., I want to turn to you. We oftentimes talk about capacity and scale, just
talking about, you know, jets or missiles. Things like that, but the human
element here is really, really important, and it takes many years to get a mission
ready, pilot or a maintainer, that’s seasoned that can really fix the jet under
trying circumstances.
Can you talk us about this problem a little bit how we manage that capacity
element the right capabilities at the human level?
John “JV” Venable: That’s a big loaded question, and I’m grateful for it,
Doug. I want to pile on to what the bosses said, Stutz and Gonzo, just, this is
where we are right now. And what we’re talking about is the tip of the iceberg.
You can only cover so much in a podcast, but I’m going to [00:17:00] run down
the human capital side and talk to you about what it takes to create combat
mission ready operator, that’s a fighter pilot, a bomber pilot, controller on the
ground, security forces man or woman that is guarding our bases.
But I’m going to use primarily my history and my understanding of takes to
create a fighter pilot in the United States Air Force, and you can apply it across
the spectrum. As you mentioned, Doug, and as everyone has talked about, it
takes a while from funding to get an F 35 on the ramp or to get a LRASM into
our magazine. About 2 to 3 years is about the optimum level right now, just
because of the supply chain and the funding streams and how all that takes
place.
General Deptula mentioned and Gonzo reemphasized how we need to prioritize
this capacity thing and start acquiring these new weapon systems because of
that timing. But what I’m going to tell you right now is it’s much more
[00:18:00] exacerbated when you start talking about bringing someone in the
Air Force to fly an airplane. From the time you actually get someone to flight
school until they get through the pipeline into their operational weapon system,
be it a B 52 pilot or a, um, an F 35 pilot. It takes 2 to 3 years under optimum
circumstances now to do that.
Our drought in flying time, our drought in flying hours is likely exacerbated
that. But that’s 2 to 3 years. Once you get them into an operational unit, they’re
novices. They may be able to go out and employ the airplane, but they’re not
able to lead people and they need to actually be led into combat.
And to have a supervisor over the top of them that’s actually making decisions
for them, guiding them and how employ their aircraft. In order for that person
who’s graduated from flight school to upgrade to a supervisory level, where
they’re able to actually guide [00:19:00] the actions of another individual in the
fighter community, it takes 500 hours of flying time. Accumulated to do that.
Back in the Cold War era that you could do that in 2 years, because pilots were
getting 200, 250 hours a year. Today, pilots are getting 130 hours a year. And so
it takes 4 to 5 years of flying experience in order for those people to upgrade.
To go to the next level to be able to actually instruct folks to actually have that
tier of of capability inside an operational unit used to take another 2 years.
Now it’s 2 to 4 years. And so now you’re looking at an operator coming into the
service from the time they get into the service until the time they’re at the
highest end of their operational capability. It takes about 9 years under today’s
circumstances. And they’re 1 to 2 years away from actually walking out the door
if they so choose.
This is a [00:20:00] significant situation. And as long as our pilots are getting
those draconianly low levels of flying time, we’re going to continue to have
slow upgrades, slow engagements of folks being able to maximize their
potential. And if I was to look at the air battle management side, or, or to look at
the bomber pilot side, they’re all the same.
If you look at the recent accident reports, bomber pilots, the experienced ones
are flying 1 sortie a month. Not one sortie a week like they should be flying, but
one sortie a month and I don’t care what you’re doing or what occupation you
have. You cannot maintain competency. Imagine being a professional football
team and you’re practicing 1 day a week, on average, one day a week. And
you’re supposed to go to a game and face off against a peer competitor who’s
practicing as General Deptula said and General Stutzriem said, they’re, the
Chinese are [00:21:00] now flying at the rates that we knew during the Cold
War. They’re flying 4 or 5 times a week, and we’re supposed to be able to go in
and master that football game? The odds are stacked against us.
Maj. Gen. Larry “Stutz” Stutzriem, USAF (Ret.): Right.
Doug Birkey: Yeah. It’s unreal. And what’s terrifying about what you’re saying
is if the balloon goes up and we got to go, it doesn’t matter how much money
you dump on the situation. You’re never going to regain that time. And I think
that’s one of the most catastrophic things about we surrender time year after
year, where we never get on top of this from a readiness perspective, capacity
perspective, capability perspective.
And I mean, in World War Two, you think about it, much simpler time in terms
of the systems in play and all that. But it really took until about the winter of
1944, before we actually got on the step with enough crews. And that was a
total commitment by the nation. But again, much simpler deal to train a P 51
pilot versus a fifth gen pilot.[00:22:00]
And we almost lost the war in that span. For two years, they could only project
enough force. To just hang on with their fingernails. That was way different
than fighting to win decisively. And it wasn’t till 44 that we could do that. And
we’re not going to be able to have those kind of tolerances in the future.
It’s going to be play to win real fast, real intense. And by what you’re saying, we
risk running out of the qualified crews and not have the ability to reset. That’s
terrifying.
So, General Deptula, I want to turn to you and put your air commander hat on. I
mean, we all know, we talked about it a lot. You planned the air campaign for
Desert Storm with a much larger force in many ways, twice as large, if not
more.
And that was a regional conflict. what we’re talking about now are very large
theater conflicts concurrently around the world. All of them essential taking into
account what JV said, what Stutz says, can you talk to us about the scale issue
from the air commander seat?
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah, sure. Doug. The [00:23:00] issue
is scale, starting at the macro level is directly related to the demands of our
national security strategy. Um, and most people don’t get up to this level, but
that’s where we need to start. I would share with you that there are two enduring
tenants of our national security strategies over the years, regardless of political
party in power that have served the United States well.
First, that we will maintain sufficient military forces and capabilities and
capacity to engage around the world to shape the environment to secure and
promote peace and stability. And second, that in the event we do need to fight,
we’ll do so away from U. S. territory in a fashion that puts the other combatants
value [00:24:00] structures at risk and be able to win more than one major
regional conflict at a time.
Now the reason for that, just to elaborate a bit, is if we only plan to be able to
handle one and our adversaries know that as part of a declaratory strategy, all
that does is encourage adventurism, if in fact we do get involved in a single
major regional conflict. In order to be able to accomplish both of these
fundamental tenets that I laid out, we need a set of robust, capable, and ready
forces with a rotational base sufficient to sustain those worldwide operations.
You know, it just drives me nuts when I hear uninformed Congress people, uh,
who want to slash the defense budget to say uninformed ignorance. When they
talk about it, they compare the U. [00:25:00] S. defense strategy to being more
than the next seven or eight nations combined.
The next seven or eight nations don’t have the same national security strategy of
global engagement that the United States does. So, it is a non sequitur to make
those kinds of comparisons. Today, the United States Air Force has less than
half the number of combat forces that than we had during Desert Storm and all
the key trends are headed in the wrong direction.
If you look at total numbers of fighter squadrons, we’re 58 percent less today.
We had 134 in 91. We have 56 today. In terms of flight hours per month, we
were flying 22, over 22 hours a month in 91. Today we’re looking at 6.8. That’s
70 percent less. And our average combat fighter [00:26:00] age is three times
older than it was in 1991.
Now, going back to what Stutz started us off with, are the threats today greater
than or less than what we faced in Iraq in 1991? Well, I’ll give you the answer.
They’re very much greater. But our Air Force has less than half the combat
forces to deal with those threats. Now, it’s not just about the combat aircraft.
It also comes into the issue of munitions. In Desert Storm, the attack plans that I
built applied about 5,000 weapons a day. Ten years later, when I had the good
fortune of being the Combined Air and Space Operations Center Commander
during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, I got a call from the Pentagon
about a month into the conflict telling me to ease up on the couple of hundred or
so precision guided [00:27:00] munitions a day we were using because we were
using up the JDAM inventory.
The situation today would be really stressed, given the significant and
significance in the target base we’d have to deal with. So, scale really matters if
you want to win. So, that’s another priority the new Department of the Air Force
Secretary Meink, uh, designate has to fix.
Build a stockpile of conventional precision munitions in advance of conflict.
That’s absolutely necessary because today’s defense industrial base is simply
unable to adequately respond to crisis. And by the way, we’re never going to get
that capacity back.
Doug Birkey: Now, and I think if you talk about, especially that thing about
why is defense budget, you know, so much larger and all that.
And again, it goes back to what are our responsibilities with our global interests,
but they’re [00:28:00] also not factoring in what is the cost of losing? And right
now, what everybody is saying is, if our back is against the wall, we don’t have
the capability or the capacity to truly win. The adversary gets a vote about when
they toss a towel, and as Russia proves with what they’re doing in Ukraine, not
quitting is a viable strategy.
So, it’s pretty easy just to run us out of Schlitz, and that is a very, very
dangerous position which to be.
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah, and we do, what you hit on is
some of the dangers that we encounter in the context of what we are nominally
very, very guilty of. Uh, and that’s mirror imaging. So, your point with the
Russians is a very good one.
They don’t have the same perspectives toward human life than we do. Putin
doesn’t care that he’s losing a thousand or fifteen hundred people a day. He’ll
search anywhere to find them and throw them into the meat grinder. That’s not
the way the United States operates. What we need to ask [00:29:00] ourselves is
how do we respond to that kind of a strategy?
Doug Birkey: JV, I want to pivot back to you. You’ve been doing a lot of
research on readiness. In fact, we just did a podcast on it with you as lead a few
weeks ago, which is awesome. And I commend everybody, if you haven’t
listened to it already. But I’m guessing it’s a major priority in your mind right
now for the new administration.
And I think it’s really important here to thread the needle on this very carefully
because people can cheat through readiness accounts and all that and it happens
all the time. But there’s a point when you actually cut into bone and you put the
human capital side of the equation into a death spiral.
You put the equipment into a death spiral because things get so bad, so
degraded. It’s kind of like, your house, I mean, if you let the roof go too long,
you’re actually going to have the structure rot because you get water incursion.
And given where the numbers that turned up to just went through and flying
hours and things like that, I’m guessing we’re pretty close to that right now.
Is that true?
John “JV” Venable: Yeah, it’s in a bad state. think that I bin [00:30:00]
readiness into three different categories. In order for a force to be able to go out
and win it has to have the capacity, the capability, and the readiness of
machinery and the manpower to go out and execute the mission. General
Deptula and Stutz have done a great job talking about the capacity and the
capability, the modernization, how technically adept and advanced are our
fighters.
And our bombers, but the readiness posture of our combat units is another thing
entirely. The average pilot in the United States Air Force is flying 6 times a
month right now. Roughly 1 and a half times a week. The service’s own
demands for minimum sorties in order to be considered ready are eight sorties
for an experienced pilot and nine for a new guy coming into the unit.
And so they’re either batting 75% or 66%, depending on which one you’re
looking at on the minimum. They’re not making the minimums in order to be
considered ready. and I [00:31:00] talked about this earlier. Imagine a football
team going against the Chinese. A Chinese football team that’s practicing every
day of the week, and you only get one rep a week.
It’s not, those odds are not good. The aircraft are also in really bad shape. The
average mission capable rate in the United States Air Force is around 60 percent
for its fighters, and it’s less than that for its bomber fleet. What that means is for
every 10 aircraft on the ramp, six of them are capable of executing one of the of
the units missions that it has, and it’s a doc statement. One of them. Today that
that those numbers are baffling considering the overall capacity that we have in
the service being the smallest in its history.
It is also the least ready with regard to its aircraft. The reason why they’re so
poorly kept right now is twofold. The maintenance side, the maintainer, aspect
of it. How many maintenance [00:32:00] personnel do we have that are fully
qualified to go in and fix these aircraft is one side of it. And the other one is
spare parts. How much of our, equipment do we have to go in and pull right off
the shelf and then swap a box for a box? And how many times are we waiting
for that box
or a repaired box to come back in. The Air Force has been funding flying hours
at a rate that is equivalent to the sequestration days of 2012. For the last 12, 13
years, they’ve been funding at the same rate, but they’ve been funding spare
parts at between 80 percent of the requirement to fly all those hours and 85%.
And so the draconian low number of flying hours, the Air Force is funding. It
means that units can’t even fix the airplanes to fly them at that rate. So, what
does all this add up to is if you were to take a fully mission capable [00:33:00]
fighter squadron or bomber squadron, that means that they’re capable of doing
all of the mission set that that unit has in it’s doc statement. It’s operational
capability statement of the things that it’s supposed to be able to do. In 2016
General Dave Goldfein said that there were 4 of 32 active duty fighter
squadrons that were capable of doing all of its missions. Today, because of the
low mission capability rate of both the aircraft and the aviators, there’s not a unit
in the United States Air Force that’s capable of executing all of its missions.
Most of them are down to at least some, if not less than half of their missions.
And Doug, as you know, when you’re not capable of doing all of your missions,
it’s the number 1 mission that you’re not able to do, which is to go out and
engage a peer competitor and defeat them on the battlefield. And so there are
cases that I can point out later of specific engagements that I’ve [00:34:00] had
conversations that pointed out.
But there is no unit in the Air Force that’s capable of going out and executing its
mission right now, to defeat a peer competitor. And that ought to, put hair
raising on the back of a lot of people’s necks right now.
Doug Birkey: if you think about it, we’ve had periods of time where in the Cold
War, we were a smaller force, but we were really proud of the training.
And so that was going to save us. And there are also eras where, okay, we’re
going to be smaller, but we’re going to have way more capable systems. And so
we’re going to get them that way. Right now, we’re eroding all of those
principles. So, now we’re a small, not ready force and we’ve got really old stuff.
And so you can cheat maybe one of those, but you can’t cheat them all across
the board.
Gonzo and Stutz, I want to pivot back to you. You served during the Cold War,
obviously, when we really last looked at serious peer competition with
existential interests on the line. Talk to us about what readiness and
modernization looked like back [00:35:00] then and some of the lessons learned
you absorbed in those early years of your career and what you would offer up to
leaders today when they take office?
Mark “Gonzo” Gunzinger: Hey Stutz, I think Doug just called us old.
Maj. Gen. Larry “Stutz” Stutzriem, USAF (Ret.): Yes, I think so.
Mark “Gonzo” Gunzinger: So, one lesson I learned from years routinely
flying my 13 hour training sorties and B 36s… It’s a joke, it’s a joke. And
spending every third week on nuclear alert, and that’s not a joke, was our Air
Force must remain ready to fight tonight.
Mission readiness was everything. So, our military moved away from
maintaining that kind of fight tonight readiness after the Cold War. And, you
know, that wasn’t unreasonable given the contingencies the services were asked
to prepare for were far more discretionary in nature. But! And a big but. That’s
not the case today.
China is now capable of launching a campaign of aggression in the Pacific with
little prior warning, and the cost of a U. S. military failure to defeat it would
[00:36:00] threaten disability of our rules-based international order, nothing
short of that. A major US defeat in the Pacific. We give China the upper hand in
a fight to replace the US as the world’s leading economic military power.
So, the new administration is right to focus on war fighting, lethality,
meritocracy, standards and readiness to Pete Hegseth. But war fighting ethos is
not enough. History has shown that it’s a critical advantage in war, but it cannot
compensate for a force that is undersized. And technologically out matched. A
laser focus on warfighting must be accompanied by larger defense budgets that
will grow the capabilities and capacity of our military.
Doug Birkey: I want to jump in and say something too. When you talk about
China displacing us, that’s not just swapping like, you know, Oh, the United
Kingdom and then the U. S. rises up and all that. Yeah the value sets pretty
aligned, whatever, you know, lights come [00:37:00] on the next day, no
problem. This is a fundamentally different set of values and perspectives. And
let me tell you, Americans are not going to like those kind of values. Ask the
people of Hong Kong how they like life right now.
I mean, it is radically different in ways that are seismic and existential, and we
cannot emphasize that enough.
Mark “Gonzo” Gunzinger: Shack, absolute shack.
Maj. Gen. Larry “Stutz” Stutzriem, USAF (Ret.): Yeah, I want to pull on a
thread of what Gonzo said about fighting tonight or being prepared to fight
tonight. You go back to the Cold War, my first decade as a fighter pilot, what a,
different environment. And it was all about, two things, continued vigilance and
frequent readiness exercises. And they were tough. We had inspector generals
back then that were black hatted. And, you know, you’d be recalled. You were
expected to generate your aircraft on no notice. Your operation security, that is
your comms and things, were [00:38:00] evaluated, to make sure you didn’t spill
what was going on.
And then the training, the actual exercise, you would deploy, you would
reconfigure aircraft for combat lines and then you’d fly and be graded on how
well you did that in some deployed location. And all this time it was very
realistic, you know, simulated airfield attacks. And of course your crews would
have to go out and fix the runways simulated.
Sometimes they’d actually dig out a hole and force them to do it for real. And
then we did a chemical warfare, and had to wear this, you know, charcoal garb,
both, on the ground and in the cockpit.
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): And it was hot.
Maj. Gen. Larry “Stutz” Stutzriem, USAF (Ret.): And it was hot and it was
tough. And I think General Deptula, you know, being part of that, in fact, the
same time in this, over in the Pacific, this was really serious stuff.
I mean, you know, we watched as young guys, commanders, wing commanders
that were fired. For not being on the step of readiness with their guys, of
stumbling [00:39:00] on this. I mean, it was serious stuff and the incentives
were that you were good at that. So there’s no sit around time. We studied a lot
about their adversary, what they flew, how they flew.
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): And by the way, uh, just to interrupt
here to emphasize your point Stutz, we used to laugh and make fun of adversary
pilots that, you know, got less than 10 hours a month flying time. And here we
are, if you all in the audience recall, the statistic, just recently quoted. Here we
are flying at that rate, actually lower, much lower than that rate.
Maj. Gen. Larry “Stutz” Stutzriem, USAF (Ret.): And for some of us, we
didn’t know that was happening, for a while in the Air Force when we found out
about it was just shocking because one of the secrets to American air power
dominance is the fact that we train so hard. That we do, had, this ethos and I’ll
just say that’s not the culture the Air Force has today.
It [00:40:00] has to get back to that because even if you infuse it with capacity
and modern capability, you have to restore that vigilance and ready to fight
tonight, Gonzo, you said it’s number one.
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Well, it reminds me of a saying that
General Jumper used to use when he was the chief of staff. He used to say, Hey,
look, you can take, this is when we had, the aircraft advantage in terms of,
maneuverability and other elements of superior over, our adversaries.
And he used to say, look, we could trade places. You could take a U. S. fighter
pilot and put it in an adversary aircraft and we’d beat the adversary pilot flying a
U. S. aircraft every day. And he said that because he was emphasizing what you
just talked about. Our key element that we rested our laurels on for decades was
that, yeah, we might be outnumbered in terms of capacity, but we had better
training [00:41:00] and we can no longer say that.
Maj. Gen. Larry “Stutz” Stutzriem, USAF (Ret.): Yep. Yep.
John “JV” Venable: And we had the absolute will to fight. We were so
confident that we could take on the Russians that we were ready to go at any
minute. We had the flying time. We had the training exercises. We knew it from
start to finish. And today it’s so different boss, I interviewed a bunch of pilots at
Spangdahlem in 2016 said you’re flying 1.4 sorties a week are you ready to go
to war? And every pilot said, absolutely. I’m ready to go to war today. And I
said, okay, the balloon goes up. You’re sent as a SEAD squadron to go and take
on Kaliningrad, one of the most heavily defended places in the world. And
you’re ready for that. And every pilot from lieutenant to squadron commander
said, Oh, no, not that. There would be too many casualties involved with that.
The attrition rate would be too high. We wouldn’t go there. And this was a
guffaw for me [00:42:00] that that mindset, that culture seems to have shifted in
a very bad way.
Maj. Gen. Larry “Stutz” Stutzriem, USAF (Ret.): Yeah. If I could add one
last thing and, and, uh, General Deptula, I’m curious how you think about this.
But in the mode, the Air Force has been in now for about 25, 30 years.
You don’t have the warfighter leadership at the colonel and above level that has
been brought up under this expectation that you will learn how to lead, to be
vigilant, to exercise tough. And have that exercise experience of having to do
that. It’s just, it’s, it’s not in the system. And of course, in the last 20 years or so,
there’s just been such a concentration of power out of the air operation center,
directing traffic.
There’s not been any requirement to get back into that. So I don’t know if you
think that’s a, a deficiency. I see it perhaps.
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah, I know. I would agree with you a
thousand percent Stutz. [00:43:00] We have unfortunately and this gets into an
area we could do an entire separate podcast on this topic. And I’m speaking very
candidly here now.
We used to embrace the notion of centralized command, decentralized
execution. We have modernized that to, centralized, command, distributed
planning, decentralized execution. But the fact of the matter is, we evolved in
these wars of counterinsurgency operations, very, very highly centralized into
adopting the former Soviet model of centralized command, centralized
execution.
So, we’ve raised a whole generation of folks who don’t have the responsiveness
or the training to be able to operate in distributed, or decentralized manner.
Maj. Gen. Larry “Stutz” Stutzriem, USAF (Ret.): Yeah.
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): But rather wait to be told what to do.
Maj. Gen. Larry “Stutz” Stutzriem, USAF (Ret.): Yeah.
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): That is a [00:44:00] recipe for failure
and it has to be reversed. Well said.
Doug Birkey: I just want to jump in and can bring this to the higher level and
pull a lot of threads you guys are talking about, and that is fundamentally
service identity. For the last 20 plus years, the Air Force and Guardians and
space professionals were part of that for a long time.
It was really support entity. And I think there’s got to be a radical rethinking of
identity where people have got to wake up and realize the apex of the solution,
the way to their responsibility is going to come down to air power and space
power, and it is every airman and every guardian’s responsibility to champion
and challenge others who don’t believe about why these unique attributes that
bring the equation, why it’s so important, what air power and space power do.
I mean, it is absolutely foundational for national security, and these are complex
skills, and it really, really demands everything to make it happen. This is not
easy. And so I’ve never met a Marine [00:45:00] that says, you know, today’s
not a good day to discuss opposed beach landings that I don’t want to go there.
That might offend somebody.
And yet I meet airmen and guardians who negotiate against themselves every
single day and say, well, I don’t want to be a Mitchell zealot. I don’t want to get
out too far. That’s not my lane. Are you kidding me? It is your moral imperative
to understand why you matter. how you matter, and roll up your sleeves and
fight.
And if you don’t, that’s how you end up with multi decade invasions. The other
piece here is that the facts are on your side. You know, if you look at the China
fight against Russia, what we’re dealing with in Iran, these are air and space
dominant. You have got to argue and be comfortable for doing that.
And, you know, there’s a final point here too. There’s this notion, we’ve said a
lot over the last 20 years, I’d see it on the Hill all the time, especially with the
Army, where our guys are [00:46:00] bleeding. Well, I kind of go back to
Patton, he was right. The objective here is to win smartly, not just die. The point
is to make the other guy die.
And so let’s stop it with this last tactical mile bluster. I mean, airmen and
guardians, they’ve done their share. I mean, we lost more members of the 8th
Air Force in World War II than the entire Marine Corps did in the Pacific. You
know, names like San Miguel, Schweinfurt, Tokyo, Migalle, Thud Ridge, they
mean something.
And that’s airmen given they’re all, a heck of a lot of them dying or ending up as
POWs. We’ve given it the office. On the space side of the equation, I can think
individuals like Tom Stafford, Buzz Aldrin, Gus Grissom, who pushed it to the
absolute edge in expanding what space power meant. And you look at Gus
Grissom I mean he gave it all in Apollo one in that fire.
It’s horrific, but he did it and we don’t have anything to apologize for we’ve
done it. But we also have better Solutions that can bring to the table and we’ve
got to bring some swagger on that [00:47:00] and some willingness to commit
and fight. But what does everybody else think about that?
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Well, let me jump in there Doug first.
It’s illuminating to realize that no more than a handful of officers remain in the
Air Force today who served in our last major theater conflict, Desert Storm. The
vast majority have only known the counterinsurgency operations conducted in
Iraq and Afghanistan that they participated in. These were entirely different
operations from what will be required to fight and win against a peer
competitor.
Now, to kind of tag on to what you, brought up some of the writings and
discussion coming out of Air University and in military journals and
publications ignore or erroneously discount offensive counter air where there’s
virtually no discussion on the necessity of conventional strategic [00:48:00]
attack against key centers of gravity that will be necessary to win.
This is very concerning, and it needs to be addressed by refocusing study of
what’s required to win in a major theater conflict. And studying how to win, as
we did in Desert Storm as a last example, not how to lose, as we did at the
strategic level in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, Paula Thornhill and Lieutenant
Colonel Shane Praisewater recently wrote an article entitled U. S. Air Force
Culture Needs a Reboot.
I commend it to everybody listening. In it, they state that general officers have
assumed some fights are unwinnable, so the best the U. S. Air Force can do is
participate in operations rather than train to defeat an adversary. Second, there’s
too [00:49:00] much focus on standoff weapons. And third, a profound lack of
knowledge, much less critical understanding of Air Force history. Emphasis is
on something that they’re calling now pulsed operations and standoff weapons
and tactics suggest that Air Force leaders believe that the threat can only be
managed, not defeated. That attitude needs to change, and airmen need to get
back to identifying and solving complex operational problems, and reaffirming
that they are the ones that hold an essential key to victory.
Mark “Gonzo” Gunzinger: So, real quick, about 10 years ago, I was asked to
join a small group meeting with the Air Force’s undersecretary, and the under
wanted to pick our brains on how we could help airmen feel proud about the
fact that the Air Force was performing as a support force to the Army in Iraq
and Afghanistan. [00:50:00] So others in a small group offered their thoughts on
that while I kind of sat there with my mouth hanging open.
And when it was my turn to speak, I said, hey, that was the wrong question. The
real issue was how to ensure America’s airmen understood that the Air Force is
a war winning force and the air power is inherently offensive in nature and not
an adjunct to other services. And the reaction in the room was, uh, what you’d
expect if someone had thrown a nasty object on the table.
But my point is, I’m concerned that school of thought took root in the Air Force
over the last 20 years. And we see echoes of it today in the service’s planning
documents, reports, and uh, even explanations of the service’s new force design.
It really appears at times that if some Air Force leaders are more concerned, as
you said General Deptula about how not to lose a war with China, then how
they can win it.
And that might explain why some are giving up on strategic attack, which
would, [00:51:00] again, cede China’s interior’s operational sanctuary to its
forces.
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah, they just, I mean, I mean, it goes
back to a lot of this is expertise. If you haven’t participated in something, this is
why understanding Air Force history is so important.
And you, if you haven’t participated in or experienced something, then you
study those that have and learn from that. And of course it has to be adopted to
the particular exigencies of the threat and the capabilities that exist today. But
we need to get back to basics in the Air Force.
Maj. Gen. Larry “Stutz” Stutzriem, USAF (Ret.): Let me just add too going
back to the threats we discussed at the front end. If you, if you don’t believe that
the United States is headed for a peer conflict, you’re just not, conscious. Our
ability to deter has been eroded and our threats are racing. So if you’re a military
service, any military service, and you’re in this stew of threat [00:52:00] today,
all should be oriented toward making sure every, in this case, airman or
guardian, as you brought up, Doug, are consumed with understanding air power,
how to practice it, how to teach it, how to defend it, how to advocate, it toe to
toe, how to recognize when it’s being misused.
How to communicate, how it can be best used. And right now we don’t have a
history, program, Air Force history program at the Academy. Our air university,
there’s lots of stories about people on the faculty wanting to expand the horizons
of, Hey, well, let’s consider how weak or ineffectual, or let’s challenge the role
of air power and Desert Storm, or let’s challenge the role of air power, in the
Pacific.
That needs to be purged because if we’re going to fight in the next couple of
years, we got to be single minded. And ready to fight tonight. So, there are
some [00:53:00] things culturally within the air force. I think need to bend and
break, uh, and possibly be rebuilt.
Doug Birkey: You know, and I think too, that that goes to the idea of
communications and internally, it’s about equipping airmen and guardians with
the courage of their convictions and backing them to go to the table on that and
truly making sure they understand because the facts are on their side.
And that’s why things like General Alvin’s op ed from the last week, where he
really leaned forward that the Air Force is important, needs more resources and
all that, that’s very important, because not only is he making an argument, but
he’s signaling that it is okay to lean in with that, that kind of, uh, case.
And I’d also wag a flag, or wave a flag caution here, and the Air Force
leadership spent the last year talking about And I get it. That’s important. But
last time I checked, reorgs don’t win wars, and nobody joins a service to be part
of a reorg. They strap into a jet, they fly into harm’s way, and hopefully they
prevail, get the mission job [00:54:00] done, and come back home safe.
Congress, they’re not going to double down on fixing things like readiness or
procurement, you name it, based on the reorg. So, we need to get leaders back
to talking about the fundamentals and really bringing forth that warfighting
view. And then externally, it may hit this fast because I know we’re getting tight
on time.
But we need to really talk about smart engagement around this town. For too
long, the Air Force, and I’d say the Space Force, have been very defensive. They
go to the accident that already happened. This member of Congress is upset. I
gotta go calm him down. Or this just blew up on me. Let’s stop doing that and
start thinking a couple plays down the table. You know, here’s an example for
the first time in like ever that I can remember we’ve got senior members of
Congress who have fundamental equities.
The speaker of the house is a bomber guy he has barksdale the senate majority
leader is a bomber guy he’s got Ellsworth. [00:55:00] Uh, last time I checked,
that’s a pretty good thing. What are we actually doing to capitalize upon that in
terms of strategy? What are other coalitions we’re building out there to move the
ball forward?
There’s a reason why members of Congress have really embraced the
shipbuilding account thing with the Navy. And they’re right, the shipbuilding
thing is hugely important, I’m a fan of that. But we don’t hear anything on air
power or space power enough. And so we’ve got to develop this, but it takes
some serious cultivation and stop this reactionary stuff.
And then the media is a key part of that too. It’s a force multiplier and they’ve
got to lean in and build these relationships with the reporters. And it takes a
long time and get the trust, but they got to invest in this and it can’t just be the
ultra safe talking points. It’s got to be real.
Mark “Gonzo” Gunzinger: Hey, Doug, let me throw in something about the
nuclear triad.
We haven’t mentioned that too much. Now, the Air Force is responsible for two
of the three legs of our nuclear triad, and those two legs are aging out. We have
1970s era [00:56:00] Minuteman III ICBMs in the silos. And we have nuclear
capable air launched cruise missiles that were never designed for today’s threat
environment.
Now, every administration since the 60s has said the triad is a foundation for
our nation’s defense. It underpins everything else our military does. But we have
neglected nuclear modernization since the Cold War, and we must now get on
with the job. And that’s going to require additional resources. The Air Force
can’t play this Rob Peter to pay Paul.
It modernizes conventional forces, and modernizes nuclear forces, and increase
it’s readiness, and everything else is responsible to do it at the same time. And
there’s no, no, no margin for delayings to our nuclear modernization.
Doug Birkey: That’s huge. And Gonzo, I just want to pull the thread in that a
little bit more because everything we’re dancing around ties to money in many
ways.
And you were the lead person on two of our most impactful reports, and they
both dealt with Air Force [00:57:00] resources, you know, need for more
money. Could you walk us through those circumstances and really what leaders
today that are coming to office should think about to help improve those odds?
Mark “Gonzo” Gunzinger: Sure. Well, the, uh, again, the short answer is the
nation needs more Air Force. That requires more resources.
Now, I said the Air Force remains the most underfunded service, and we’ve
published reports showing that’s been true for 30 years. Compared to other
services, the Air Force absorbed the biggest hits to its budget after the Cold
War, and the damage it created has never been remedied. But you wouldn’t
know that if you relied on DoD’s official budget documents, because they still
show the Air Force’s budget share is commensurate with the Army and Navy’s
share.
That’s because DoD includes about 45 billion, a number that grows every year.
And the Air Force’s budget that the Secretary of the Air Force cannot spend on
new aircraft, on readiness, and other requirements. That 45 billion just passes
through the [00:58:00] service’s accounts on the way to other DOD
organizations.
The Air Force has no control over it. So, how can we ask our Congress to make
informed decisions on a defense budget with that kind of erroneous
information? And, uh, real quick, let me talk about, um, uh, the National
Defense Strategy 2018. You know, Secretary Mattis decided in 2018 that the
new construct for sizing our military should be a single war instead of two wars.
Which had been the case for decades before 2018.
Why? Because it is imperative that we deter a second aggressor when we are
involved in a war in another theater. But that was assumed away on the basis
that Secretary Mattis thought the U. S. military could no longer afford a two war
force. Well, guess what? We now see Russia engaged in the largest war in
Ukraine since World War II.
We see China in the Pacific [00:59:00] becoming increasingly aggressive and
all but telegraphing that they’re going to make a move on Taiwan. We see the
formation of this new axis of evil, as it’s been called, with China, Russia, Iran,
and North Korea. So, how can we continue to wish away preparedness to deter
or fight and win a second war on the basis of a few dollars?
Doug Birkey: That’s incredibly well said. Another part of the equation here is
roles and missions discipline. General Deptula, you’ve got a lot of experience in
that. And we can’t have every service trying to do every single mission. There’s
a point where some are more effective and better stewards of resources.
Thoughts on that?
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Yeah, Doug, this is a topic we could
speak for hours about, literally. And you’re absolutely right. First, let me set the
conditions here. I’ve had the good fortune of being a joint task force commander
twice, and I’ve actually commanded soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in
combat. And I believe that we [01:00:00] need the strongest Army, Navy, Air
Force, Space Force, and Marines in the world.
But that does not mean that the Department of Defense, and nation, should not
shift our limited resources to where they are needed the most to meet the
challenges that we face. Right now, today, the United States Army is spending
billions of dollars on hypersonic long range missiles that are too threatening for
allies to host in peacetime and too heavy to deploy in wartime.
And quite frankly, that fulfilled the mission that’s a role of the Air Force. A red
flag should be thrown on that. Second, The Army’s building its own satellite
constellations for organic use. That’s not joint. That’s a Space Force mission. So,
they ought to throw a red flag on that. Third, the Army has built multi domain
task forces that are clearly the prerogative and [01:01:00] role of the combatant
commanders.
Not the army component. So, instead of poaching on these mission areas that
are rightfully belong and other services and with the COCOMS, they ought to
be spending on their own roles and missions where they can actually contribute
to joint force operations. Missions like air and missile defense. That’s just a
tidbit of an introduction of to what needs to occur inside the Department of
Defense with a new administration coming on board.
The new administration needs to set as their number one priority an honest roles
and missions review among all the services. And by the way, uh, we haven’t had
a roles and missions review since we’ve had the newest service come on board,
the Space Force. So that’s another impetus, uh, for calling for an honest roles
and missions review.
Doug Birkey: Now, it’s so important, and it kind of reminds me of what
happened in sequestration, where the Air Force, desperate for cash, [01:02:00]
was going after the A 10 to sunset it. And the Army, at the same time, was
buying new Apaches, but the A 10 is a far better close air support aircraft. And
that’s because we weren’t doing a comparison.
You know, outside the stove pipes. And so we’re killing the grade a option and
buying something that was costly and not as effective. And this is what happens
when you don’t have discipline and really look holistically missions. Okay. So,
we’re at the end. I just want to do a lightning round going around the table here.
We’ve all made these pitches before, and quite often we get eye rolls and people
go, well, it’s just too hard. It’s never going to happen. You got to temper your
expectations. What do you say to people that do that? Stutz, let’s start with you.
Maj. Gen. Larry “Stutz” Stutzriem, USAF (Ret.): Well, I think there’s a lot
of hope. I’ll point out that, and you brought this up, Doug, about four days ago,
chief of staff of the air force, uh, dropped an op ed, which, I would say was
stunning for the rarity of the Air Force actually making a public [01:03:00]
statement like that.
And, uh, it really expresses, you know, the contrast in maybe the last period of
the Air Force being unwilling to really advocate strongly for increased budget
share and modernization. And you know, some of the things, uh, uh, General
Allvin said, and that was, I mean, what we’ve been saying, uh, the fleet is
smaller and older than any time in history and the gap between high end combat
training and that of our pacing competitors, China has closed dramatically.
And then he says in his article, Hey, the sons and daughters of America deserve
the best training weapons and equipment so they can fly, fight, and win. And
come home. And, and he says decisively, they do not have those right now. And
uh, he finishes the article by saying to fix all this, our airmen and America itself,
needs more air force.
Now let me tell you, if this is the beginning of an age of speaking truth to
leaders on the Hill, in the White [01:04:00] House, to the American people, this
is good for the air force. And I hope it trickles down and it sets a new mode of
operation that we have airmen truly advocating, uh, in the time of risk we’re in
today.
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Okay. So, last week, I had a doctor’s
appointment. When I met my doctor, she told me that she’d just listened to the
podcast from December where I went through the description of the Air Force
as the oldest, smallest, and least ready in its history. She told me she was
shocked and then quoted back to me my explanation that Gonzo just went
through with you all of the 45 billion dollars in pass through and the negative
impact that’s had on properly resourcing the Air Force. She repeated to me
examples of the geriatric age of our aircraft and she told me she was just
flabbergasted that the Air Force was that bad off. And then she told me that in
reality, she actually thought we had the strongest and the most modern air force
in the world.[01:05:00]
And then she quoted the statistics that the Air Force had been funded less than
the army and the navy for 30 years in a row. I was amazed at the impact those
facts had on her. The reason I bring this up is the average citizen is simply not
aware of just how seriously our Air Force has declined. The impact that
message had on her just reinforces that we need to keep repeating it over and
over and over again.
Mark “Gonzo” Gunzinger: Yeah, I’ll, uh, I’ll pile on. I think, uh, something
Stutz said uh, about General Allvin’s, uh, op ed is right on target. American
people, I’ll tell you that we have the best airmen, sailors, marines, and soldiers,
Coast Guardies, in the face of the earth, no question about it. We owe them the
best kit for them to go to war, to deter, to fight, and to win if necessary.
Because if we don’t provide them with the training, we don’t assure they have
the readiness, and they don’t have the equipment [01:06:00] they need to do
that, then we are going to see results that would just horrify you.
John “JV” Venable: Well, let me start with Doug. You, you did a great job of
talking about, congressmen and senators having weapon systems in their area
and how we can go and advocate to them over, uh, the situation of the Air
Force.
I think there’s one area where readiness is challenged in that conversation. Let
me go back and say, I think that that still leaves an area where we’re challenged
and that’s readiness has no constituency. It doesn’t bring money into an area. It
actually expends it on the airmen and training and bringing them up to speed in
a war fighting capacity.
I think we need to dwell there.
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Very good.
Doug Birkey: Gentlemen, I can’t thank you enough. And again, people that
think this is too much. I think they need to get really familiar considering
[01:07:00] what losing looks like. Look at Ukraine. You like that? Because right
now, winning or losing is going to be decided by air power, space power, and
we got to get real about fixing them, getting them healthy again.
We owe it not just to Airmen and Guardians, but to the country as a whole. A
lot rides on it. So thanks, everybody.
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): You bet. Thanks, Doug. I’ll just remind
folks, the only thing more expensive than a first rate Air Force is a second rate
Air Force.
Doug Birkey: Thanks, Doug.
Lt. Gen. David Deptula, USAF (Ret.): Thanks, Doug.
John “JV” Venable: Great to be with you, Doug.
Doug Birkey: And with that, I’d like to extend a big thank you to our guests for
joining in today’s discussion.
I’d also like to extend a thank you to our listeners for your continued support
and for tuning into today’s show. And if you like what you’ve heard today, don’t
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[01:08:00] time.