Building Alliances and Competing with China: The Imperative for UAV Export Reforms

Heather Penney
Senior Resident Fellow
The Turkish TB2 has proven an asymmetric advantage to Ukrainian forces, enabling them to defend their sovereign territory against the Russian invasion.
U.S. RPA Exports Can Strengthen Our Partners and Allies

• Provide a clear signal of U.S. commitment in an uncertain world

• Strengthen bi-lateral relationships

• Enable allies and partners to provide forward presence, deterrence, and ISR

• Enable allies and partners to more effectively blunt adversary aggression, freeing U.S. forces for other operations

• Increase interoperability across coalitions

• Improve the integration of allies and partners across the spectrum of military operations

Partners and allies are force multipliers when equipped with U.S. RPAs
What is the MTCR and why is it a problem?

“The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal political understanding among states that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MTCR Category</th>
<th>Category I</th>
<th>Category II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>&gt; 300 km</td>
<td>≤ 300 km</td>
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<tr>
<td>Payload</td>
<td>&gt; 500 kg</td>
<td>≤ 500 kg</td>
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Category I systems are subject to a “strong presumption of denial”

**The problem:** MTCR guidelines have been inappropriately expanded to apply to unmanned aerial systems
Department of State UAS Transfer Considerations:
1. Increase trade opportunities for U.S. companies.
2. Bolster partner security and counterterrorism capabilities.
3. Strengthen bilateral relationships.
5. Prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery systems.

These reforms did not fundamentally alter RPA export decisions, due to State Department misconceptions about the consequences of RPA exports.
Teams of military and civilian professionals located in theater and at remote operating locations provide an unprecedented degree of control over every step of an RPA mission…. They are not “killer bots” that populate science fiction, and they are not launch-and-leave cruise missiles.

RPA combat operations are highly scrutinized and precise operations
Overly restrictive U.S. RPA export policies have not slowed the proliferation of this important technology:

- At least 95 countries have an active military UAV inventory
- More than 36 countries operate large, armed RPA
- At least 32 countries have imported Chinese RPA

U.S. reticence to export RPA has *not slowed the proliferation of RPA* technology or employment – instead, it has created a market vacuum that other nations like China are filling.

*Source: The Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College*
The U.S. can responsibly export armed RPA to its allies and partners by defining them as aircraft and treating their export like any other U.S. military aircraft exports.

- Robust stakeholder engagement – DSCA, lead service, Bureau of Political Military Affairs
- Congressional notification and approval – Letter of Request and Letter of Authorization
- Arms Export Control Act
- International Traffic in Arms Regulations
- Conventional Arms Transfer Policy

ANY military transfer includes:
- End-use monitoring / compliance
- Scheduled inspections
- Physical inventories
- Technical data restrictions

Understanding the considerations that govern defense export decision processes provides a compelling case for reforming overly restrictive RPA export policy.
Recommendations:

1. **Define RPA as aircraft.** Define medium and large RPA, including armed RPA, as military aircraft instead of cruise missiles for the purposes of export.

2. **Assure others of U.S. commitment to nonproliferation.** Engage with other MTCR signatories to affirm the U.S. commitment to nonproliferation while simultaneously removing RPA as MTCR-controlled technologies.

3. **Expand acceptance of RPA employment norms.** Work with states that are not yet signatories to adopt the 2016 “Joint Declaration for the Export and Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.” The United States should encourage reluctant states to agree to this declaration’s principles in part, if not in whole, in conjunction with RPA export agreements.

Instead of denying RPA exports, the United States should take advantage of them to support its allies and partners, build their capacity to defend themselves, and shape the norms by which these aircraft are employed.
Recommendations (continued):

4. Engage others on RPA export and employment norms. Convene a working group to enhance monitoring protocols and end-use agreements for armed RPA exports.

5. Re-establish the United States as the preferred RPA provider to partners. Engage with allies and partners who have pursued opportunities to purchase Chinese RPA and encourage them to revisit U.S. RPA as their system of choice.

6. Explain the value of RPA export. Publicly articulate the strategic benefits of increasing armed RPA exports, to include building partner capabilities, protecting the U.S. defense industrial base, and gaining greater influence in the global RPA market.

It is time to recognize that RPA are aircraft for the purpose of exports to trusted allies and partners that support America’s national security interests.