

Building a Force That Wins: Recommendations for the 2022 Nat...

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SPEAKERS

Dr. Jim Miller, Elbridge Colby, Lt Gen (Ret.) Dave Deptula, Steve Trimble, Mark Gunzinger, John Tirpak, Lukas Autenried



Lt Gen (Ret.) Dave Deptula 00:16

Well, Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'm Dave Deptula AFA's, Dean of the Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Studies. And welcome to the release of our new report: Building a Force that Wins: Recommendations for the 2020 National Defense Strategy. This report was researched and written by Mark Gunzinger, Mitchell's Director of Future Concepts and Capability Assessments, and Lukas Autenried, Senior Analyst here at the Mitchell Institute, both of whom are with us here today. As the title suggests, this report offers recommendations on three critical issues that the administration should address as it develops its next national defense strategy. The paper comes at a pretty critical time. The Biden administration recently submitted its first defense budget request that, quite frankly, some of us think needs some serious adjustments based on the results of this study. We're also very honored to host with us today, Dr. Jim Miller and Bridge Colby on our panel. Jim is the president of Adaptive Strategies LLC and a former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy from 2012 to 2014. Bridge is a principal at the Marathon Initiative and served as one of the principal authors of the 2018 national defense strategy, when he was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development. So welcome, gentlemen. And thanks for joining us today. What we'll do is start with a presentation on the report, followed by brief remarks by guest panels panelists, and then we'll move on to questions and answers. So over to you, Gonzo for the presentation.



Mark Gunzinger 04:00

Okay, thank you, General Deptula. And thanks also to Jim and Bridge. It's great to have you all join us today. So we're going to start with a brief overview of our report. And I'll give you some context. First, there's been a lot of debate over the 2022 defense budget proposal how it does or does not align with the national defense strategy. Now our report addresses why our military must selectively increase the size of some of his forces and field new capabilities that are going to be critical to defeating great power aggression, as required by the defense strategy. The bottom line is there is no time for DOD to ramp up production of new capabilities and grow its forces in the event of a great power conflict. By the time DOD does that China or Russia will have achieved their objectives and the consequences would have a devastating impact on the United States and its allies and friends. So in this context, we believe DOD's proposed budget, frankly, continues the say-do gap between its own strategic guidance and the actions that is taking to address its priorities. We see this in the slowdown and fielding some next generation capabilities. The failure to defend our forward bases against air missile attacks, and more custom forces that are already too small to fight a single great power conflict plus defend the homeland, deter nuclear attacks and meet other defense strategy requirements. Next slide. So right to the point, our report addresses three things as mentioned by General Deptula that deities next defense strategy should address to decrease the risk of failure, any future peer conflict. First, we recommended deity not a similar way the potential in China would take advantage of our military is well known for structure and modernization shortfalls to Asian extended duration or that is intended to exhaust our capacity to fight. Simply said sizing and shaping our military for short war with China is a recipe for failure. Second, dd should return to a to war planning requirement for sizing and shaping US military. In combination sizing for one war and a relatively short one that sends our adversaries the exact wrong message. It could even invite the aggression we seek to deter. And finally duty needs new all domain warfighting concepts that will inform cross service trade offs are going to be critical to developing a cost effective war winning force of the future. Next slide. So on to the meat. As bridges explained in the past, the 2018 defense strategy says defeating a Chinese or Russian invasion of usli a friend is the most stressing challenge resizing and shaping the US military. But why is that so? Well, China and Russia will have the advantage of proximity to the battlespace in plausible scenarios such as an assault on Taiwan or invasion of the Baltic states. As this illustration shows China will be the home team while we are in a way for us it was project and sustain operations or work very long distances from the U.S. And this can give our adversaries major advantages in terms of time, the ability to quickly mass combat power in the battlespace, shorter logistics line of communication. And let's not forget, these areas are covered by their A2/AD capabilities which are intended to prevent US forces from intervening in time Next slide. DOD also created a new force employment model explains how layers of forces will deter aggression shaped battlespace, Blanchette invasion and surge to defeat and of course,

defend our homeland. But I'd like to stress this a couple of points so important to understanding how this shapes our military requirements. First, defeating a fait accompli is far better than trying to evict or rollback an enemy that has seized objective like the US coalition did in 1991, against Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait, China in Russia or not Iraq, and the massive level of force needed to do this in the Baltics or to liberate Taiwan would be prohibitive, especially against a nuclear armed opponent. Second, denying a fait accompli will require US forces that can quickly deploy and operate over long ranges from inside and outside the theater. When I say quickly, I mean within 24 hours instead of a conflict. The third US forces must be prepared to operate in environments that will remain contested throughout a campaign against a conflict against China, Russia will not be like recent wars, were able to quickly gain and maintain control over the air, sea space and cyberspace domains. So this all translates to the need for more capabilities such as warring strike systems, fifth generation aircraft that can survive and contest there's electronic warfare capabilities to degrade enemy threats, missile defenses to protect the theater, air bases and so on. deity has failed to invest in many of these capabilities over the last 30 years or at least invest sufficiently. And his latest budget indicates it still isn't serious about going faster and fielding some of that next slide. So this background was talking about the risk resourcing a military for short war. Our report illustrates this with a few examples like the one shown here, we're about 60% of the Air Force is fighters in the Pacific to blunt a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. So pick your attrition rate on this chart at 5%. attrition per day, about 236 fighters remain operational at the end of a notional fait accompli denial operation. And you can see the trend gets even uglier should be fight last beyond 19 days. DOD hasn't had to think about high attrition rates for years and it certainly hasn't stopped forces for the bus the race shown on this slide are not unreasonable. For contacts. The Israeli Air Force suffered an aircraft loss or damage rate of about 4.8% during the first week of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and in 1974, defense Science Board study Applied Nutrition rates conflict to a European scenario that concluded that US and NATO air forces could be decimated in a general war of the Warsaw Pact within two weeks. couple of caveats here, we assumed on the side that 44% of the 2034 will be fifth generation fighters. And that's pretty optimistic given it's now only about 20% fifth Gen fighters. And we also didn't include Chinese missile attacks on us air bases, which easily double these loss rates. We identify this as a major concern, since the army continues to refuse to defend us air bases against air missile attacks. Next slide. course it's not just about having enough aircraft ships and other major weapon systems, duties chronic shortfall in pgms, is another major source of risk. And this example shows how b 50. twos alone could use up about half of the Air Force's total planned inventory of jasm aurasma missiles against Chinese targets in a little over a week. And Jasmine rasm, of course, are deities premier airwatch weapons that have the low observability needed to penetrate defended areas and strike high value targets such as mobile missile launchers and a case whereas Of course pjtv ships. So similar to the last example, this burn rate can

be conservative since we only use B-50 twos to launch these missiles while the reality is but other bombers and fighters will as well. So a US commander might exhaust these weapons and just a few days of fighting with China. That means strike aircraft may have to use other programs it can be more readily intercepted by Chinese defenses or weapons do it actually increase the aircraft exposure to enemy threats and that would increase aircraft attrition rates, reduce the tempo of our strikes, and of course extend the window of opportunity for an enemy to him. Next slide. So we recommend the next defense strategy require some other services to organize, train and equip for a longer duration fight with China, specifically recommended defeating a Chinese fait accompli may not be enough, our military must also be capable of a follow on operation such as a punishment operation that attacks you Pillai Pele's ability to continue to project conventional military power. And we illustrate potential targets for a bunch of campaign in this triangle such as utilities, bomber and fighter bases, maritime forces, long range, missile launchers and so on. Now, since a conflict with China will be air sea space and cyberspace domain dominant, the predominant force providers for punishment operation will be the Air Force Base force and the Navy bluntly stated would not be a boots on the ground fight between land forces. Next slide. And that brings us to our second area of risk which is sizing of force for a single peer conflict. I'd like to start by pointing out the little table in the upper left hand side of the slide which illustrates duties force planning construct note the right hand column includes requirements to defeat aggression by a single major power which we've highlighted in red defend the homeland deter nuclear non nuclear attacks etc. A sizing for one war increases risk the second paragraphs are could take advantage of our militaries engagement in another theater and make a move that we simply would not have the forces do munitions logistics, and other capabilities to respond to effectively. And the rest of the slide shows a notional Russian invasion of the Baltic states which is been the subject of multiple wargames. But the point is, DOD should not ignore the risk. The second paragraph would take advantage of a situation where our one war military is engaged in a theater. Next slide. And just a couple of illustrations emphasize potential magnitude of those force capacity shortfalls should that happen. Now deity already has a major shortfall in long range strike capacity, especially a shortfall in stealth bombers that can penetrate and deliver large payloads of weapons. And the left hand column in this slide projects the airforce may have about 109 bombers available for combat missions in 2013. That's our projection. And that's an increase from today's 86 primary mission bombers which is a new all time low for the Air Force. The middle column shows that for us might have a shortfall of about 77 bombers for a fight with China. Plus maintain enough aircraft a homeland to deter nuclear attacks. And then the right hand column adds a column Russia which nearly doubles the size of the shortfall, and this is why multiple analysis are shown the bomber force, which gives us commanders, the ability to immediately go on the offensive against an invading force should grow to at least 240 stealth bombers. Plus, of course, the existing B-52s. Next slide is a similar story for the Air Force's fighter force.

And this example is also based on classified analysis. But what these columns don't show is the mix of fourth and fifth generation fighters in 2030 forces I mentioned. A future high low force mix, that is skewed more towards fourth generation fighters will result in increased attrition rates in combat. Plus, the airforce no longer has reserved of fighters that can roll out through pace, combat losses, and also has a significant pilot shortfall today. And it really has no margin to absorb these losses, and it would take years to replace highly trained combat, so the loss of combat and that's why we think trading forest capacity for new capabilities is a high risk endeavor. The fact is the Air Force, and the other services have already traded as capacity for capability numerous times for the last 30 years. And frankly, now it needs more of both. Next slide. So the question to cost inevitably arises by which I mean the cost to rebuild a tool or force, it doesn't have to be as costly as some might think, since growth should be selected, and based on a predominant forces that commanders will need for fighting the Pacific and another one in here. As a first principle, we recommended duty as a whole, not every service should happen to our force. So the next defense strategy should define pacing scenarios that each service should use to size and shape their forces. Next slide. In a case the Navy Marine Corps a fight with China should drive their future requirements since it will be sea air space and cyberspace domain dominance. Next slide. And the army should primely size and shape for European flight since defeating a Russian invasion of an area like the Baltics would be land, air space and cyberspace domain dominance. Next slide. And the Air Force should be sized for both theatres since Pacific and European commandos when he Air Forces they can rapidly respond from inside and outside the theater to watch those high volume strikes against invading forces and perform other missions. So what's your victory? Now I'm going to turn to stick over to Lucas for a minute. Next slide.



Lukas Autenried 17:38

Thanks, Mark. So the third area of risk our report addresses is the lack of current joint warfighting concepts that can provide a foundation for making trade offs that maximize the combat effectiveness of future Joint Force operations. Really, there are two elements to this. The first is that the Joint Staff joint warfighting concept is late to me. Now we've had three successive defense budget requests that were supposed to focus on the 2018 defense strategies priorities. If a service have lacked a shared understanding of how they intend to fight together against the pure adversary in the future, this has been a real missed opportunity. And second, warfighting concepts are the product of the joint staffs consensus driven doctrine Velma process are typically laden with each of the services equities. This increases the risk of God will waste resources on excessively redundant programs, while exacerbating existing capability gaps like missile defense, which Mark mentioned before, this kind of joint warfighting concept will support instead of challenged the ambitions of the services that each believe they need more top line implement their

individual visions and operating concepts. And quite simply, this is not going to be affordable given the flat or declining defense budgets we expect moving forward. Next slide please. So we feel a better approach would be first rather than a single concept to develop a series to develop a series of all domain operating concepts that account for key differences in potential conflicts with China and Russia. And second, that these concepts maximize our military overall combat power rather than reinforce the services individual equities. Now, this should entail conducting cosper effect analyses to determine cross service trade offs or in other words, duty should develop all domain warfighting concepts using a process that also assesses the business cases for candidate approaches, and prioritizes. Those will maximize the US military's mission effectiveness, and we feel that long range strike offers a great example of why this type of analysis is necessary. You know, all the services operating concepts emphasize the need for a new generation of long range strike systems to counter a to add threats and create other effects and contested battle spaces. And they're all developing those capabilities accordingly. However, the truth of the matter is not all long range strike capabilities are created equal. Now this chart compares the cost of a notional army long range hypersonic weapon battery, the new stealth bomber and an existing b 52 bomber. As you can see on the left side of the graph, we started with the fixed cost to acquire the lrH w battery and new stealth bomber, as well as their operations and support costs for 30 year period. There's no acquisition Cause for the P 52. Since buffs are already in the force, although we did factor in the cost to re engineer it, and perform other upgrades Air Force has planned for the aircraft. As you move from left to right across the chart, we added the cost of munitions expended by each type of platform. As you can see, the cost of the lrH w option quickly exceeds the cost of both the bomber options. In fact, the number of weapons expended by the bombers at the crossover points identified by the red arrows are roughly what each bomber could carry in a single sortie. Now, if you extrapolate this out to the likely number of main points in a conflict with Russia, China, you can see why air launch effects must deliver the preponderance of strikes and why you know very long range, ground based fires could quickly become unaffordable beyond a niche capability. So we recommend that God conducts similar kinds of analyses to inform its investment decisions. And critically, these assessments should be domain service and platform agnostic focusing instead on how best to achieve mission goals and future operations. And with that, I'll turn it back over to Mark for some concluding thoughts. Mark.

M

Mark Gunzinger 21:08

Just two quick slides to wrap up. This is what we've already talked about. Our three recommendations theory of victory should also hedge against Chinese decision to continue operations to do it exhausts US military returning to a tour for sizing contractor to turret hedge against a second opportunity, mystic aggressor. And we think that deity

senior civilian as well as military leadership should be directly involved in creating those all domain warfighting concepts so help provide a foundation for those cross service and cross domain trade offs. Next slide. is a good place to start and evolving those concepts will be conduct a focused review of the services roles and missions and do that at the front end, not at the back end. Here are three areas we think are ripe for that review future wandering Strikeforce providers responsibility to airbase Aramis defense, a long running issue that has remained unresolved. And so with that our report will be online immediately after this presentation. And I look forward to your questions. General Deptula. Back to you.



Lt Gen (Ret.) Dave Deptula 22:21

And thanks very much, Gonzo, and Lukas for that. Let me turn it over to Dr. Jim Miller, for your comments or on the topic.



Dr. Jim Miller 22:35

Many thanks, Dave. And thanks to the Mitchell Institute for hosting this morning and to Gonzo and Lukas, for very thoughtful report. I think it's an important contribution to the debate. And I hope folks who were on the line here today, read it closely and heed its analysis and recommendations. I agree with virtually all of the reports main premises recommendations that the US needs to workforce planning construct that addresses both China and Russia, that we need to be prepared for a protracted conflict. And that's a new conceptual and all domain thinking is necessary. I would just caveat the last bit by saying I don't think we need to spend two years developing new concepts to make decisions about how to allocate resources. And I don't think we need to do a roles and missions analysis to reallocate resources. It's fine to do those in parallel. But there are a lot of changes that we know we need today. And that this report points out, I'm going to add three points to it. They're not pushing back really under reports, analysis and recommendations. They're intended to be additive. The first point is that God planning needs to take account of both the most likely and the most dangerous approaches to armed aggression from China from Russia. Neither China nor Russia wants a large scale war with United States indeed, neither one of them wants a war with United States. They'd like to win if possible, by undermining our alliance cohesion, our credibility and our will. So, even as we, as we undertake the types of steps that that this report recommends for long range, strike and related capabilities, we need to think hard about the likelihood to in some ways ongoing scenarios involving coercion and subversion. The next level up could involve China blockading Taiwan, hitting it with unremitting cyber attacks, perhaps even missile strikes or special forces. It could involve Russia's the little green men into the Baltics. It could involve in both cases, significant cyber and information warfare. And even

as the Department of Defense the nation prepare for the high intensity conflict that this report addresses, we need to also address in parallel, improving our posture for this unconventional warfare threat. The one that we're facing today, the one that we are not just likely, but virtually certain to see. Second, I want to build off the important point that in order to do better on the denial of a fait accompli. And to deal with the risk of escalation, we need to turn the dial way up on long range strike, including platforms and munitions, supporting Asr, and resilient command and control, and cyberspace, outer space, electronic electromagnetic spectrum as well. And so I think the reports got very good recommendations there. And that's going to be a fair bit of resources that need to be reallocated. And what, and I think that reports right about the that in European Theater, ground forces will play an essential role. It's important to note, it's predominantly the ground forces that are there today. It's predominantly our forward presence and our allies capabilities. And building out those capabilities, ground forces, cattle, air, etc. and making them resilient to both subversive attacks, cyber attacks and to direct kinetic attack is going to be incredibly important. And the point I want to emphasize, that I would add to this report is that for the indo Pacific theater for China, in particular, undersea warfare is absolutely critical. If United States, our SS infrastructure has gone down substantially over the last couple of decades. The four ssgn that carry cruise missiles are slated to go out of service within the next decade. And this is an area of potential and during us advantage, we need to build out our undersea force structure. And because of the costs associated with that building more SSN in particular, it means the Navy should turn the dial up on unmanned undersea vehicles that provide basically undersea our small ship, I think there's doable concepts there. And the cost of those unmanned vehicles is likely to be far less than for manned esense. That's additive to the report. And it adds to the budgetary pressure of meeting the reports, strategic analysis. And the third point I'd make, again, starting with the reports, analysis, escalation is, is is certainly possible. And I believe that God and do the nation need to analyze this and game it out and unpack it a little bit. So just as there are, I think of most likely the most dangerous approach for conflict, I think that the most likely escalation scenario, or one of the most likely may be that China or Russia would decide to dial up cyber attacks on the US homeland. They could do other things. But this is certainly one that looks attractive, and we're seeing every every signal Lydia literally today that they have that capability, and they're growing it out, I think cyber attacks, and for that matter, attacks on space assets and undersea assets, including undersea cables, is far more likely than large scale conventional attacks that alone nuclear attacks on the United States, we still need to deter those conventional and nuclear attacks, of course, but we have a long way to go on cyber and space resilience. First to support the warfighter. Secondly, to support this escalation scenario, or set of scenarios in which both China and Russia could attempt to impose economic costs while they reduce capabilities of our military through cyberspace and outer space. And I wanted, you know, finally, on this call out to the Biden administration for, for putting out a

concept for integrated deterrence, by which I think it means not just integrated military tools, but comprehensive national tools, that gets to our credibility that gets to our ability to impose diplomatic costs, economic sanctions and so forth. Those are fundamentally important. They're not sufficient without taking the military steps that this report outlines and I think is the, the baseline for where we should go. But I want to call out that the administration is on a good track there. And I hope that it pushes further. So Dave guns out, because I'll stop there. And look forward to further conversation.



Lt Gen (Ret.) Dave Deptula 29:04

Thanks very much for your comments, Jim. Bridge over to you.



Elbridge Colby 29:09

Great. Well, thanks. Thanks, Dave. Thanks, Mark. And Lucas, for a really a great report. I think I don't I have some some issues, some differences. But I think this is exactly what the conversation, the debate we should be having within this, this framework. So I really and it's also just really refreshing for you guys. You really grappled with the NDS as it actually is, and that sometimes, I get a little frustrated but but you guys really understand that and I think are getting at the tough issues which are, which are very real ones. I it's great that my great friend and mentor Jim Miller went first because there'll be a nice little difference parting of ways that I think will illuminate some of the key issues here. You know, I think I think the cons and I'll point to my friend Matt Donovan in the chat, I think put it very well. You know, I there is a real problem possibly danger in the near to medium term. And I think China and Russia actually could go to war, I don't think it's a given that they won't want war, but that they could risk it or use it for court course purposes or even more even enter into it deliberately, if they see the advantage to do so. And that will give them political leverage in any case. So I think this is the real, you know, to me, the most likely scenario is not actually the one that's less provocative and maybe the more provocative one, if that pays off for them for read, as we all we all say. So that's the kind of the mindset of course, the long term is also extremely problematic, given the trajectory of Chinese power. But you know, one of the things I think the 2018 MDS was trying to signal was we're gonna have prom is China's not a long term problem anymore. Now, it's a near problem. Is this a long term problem, but it's also a near term problem. So a couple of thoughts. You guys are exactly right about protraction. And, you know, I think and Jim, I think has made this point, sometimes been accused in some of my colleagues have been accused for maybe oversimplifying. And if we did that with a fait accompli, I'm prepared to plead guilty on the charge, because I think it was urgent enough. But you're absolutely right, that protraction is a critical issue. I would just say that the Fed have come, you know, getting the Fed to complete, right is the ticket to entry for the protraction problem,

you're not going to have an attraction for I know, you guys know that. But I would just say we're not where we need to be on the Fed to complete as you guys know, I mean, your munitions charts are showing that and it's just so frustrating. And we've got a lot of bipartisan agreement. I mean, Deputy Secretary Hicks, I'm Secretary call the nominee for assistance for Asia, Eli Ratner put in his AP cues for his hearing, I think today or tomorrow. You know, General, Admiral Aquilino. Everybody's saying it, and yet here we are, we're still not where we need to be. And I know that was Matt's question that maybe hopefully we can get to. But I think we got it tonight. But then I think you're absolutely right about attraction. I think attraction is the top priority dealing with that. I think you're right. And actually in my book that maybe I'll get to pitch at some point during this is I should call it denial, calm punishment, I think you refer to it as punishment. But actually, I think the way that you're talking about it, it's kind of a mixture. It's strict denial for the Fed accompli, which is we want to win that within limited, you know, plausible limits. And then it's going to be we're going to deny, presumably some capacity for them to regenerate the invasion capability or otherwise strike. But ultimately, the sort of victory mechanism is a form of punishment. It's their steady erosion of something that they value. And an acceptance of a limited defeat, I think is to me how I think about it seems like it's similar. Actually, I'm validating actually, to see you guys come up with the same the same place, but the kind of targets that you're talking about are, you know, it's not area bombing of cities, obviously. So so I think and that makes perfect sense. And I think that is, that's what we need, you know, Air Force, and we need penetrating strike, obviously, Navy, Air space force as well. I, you know, I agree with you in principle about the two war for sure. But we're not where we want to be on the one war, you know, I mean, we got to get one more, right. I mean, sure to war is great. But I mean, your point about how much of a deficit we have on heavy bombers, munitions deficits, Jim mentioned the submarine bathtub way behind just on the one war, and it's getting worse. I mean, I look at Tom, shoe guards testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the trend lines are even worse, I'm thinking, sure. Yeah, I mean, in theory, but if I'm orienting my money, I'm saying we got to win the big war and the biggest war that we got to win. And that includes protraction, is China and Asia, because Russia can't plausibly dominate the whole region, there will be balancing there is risk there. But I want to make sure that we get that right, China and Asia first. And I think I'm not as convinced as you that there will be the savings you suggest, by orienting the services, because it sort of seems like they're kind of looking, you know, at regions already. I don't think they're all preparing for that. I could be wrong. But But then I, you know, just okay. So is the money there? I don't see the American people saying and I mean, given where the administration's budget is, where inflation is, you know, maybe we'll get hopefully an incremental increase in the top line based on on the Pentagon's budget request the administration's but I, you know, I don't think we're talking about the levels that we need, and I'm not sure it would make sense. You know, I mean, given the the impact it could have on the economy, I don't know. But I don't think that

means we ignore the problem. But this is where I think we need our allies to step up. I mean, it's completely inexcusable and unsatisfactory that European allies are not contributing 2%. I mean, most, and I've got a piece I say this, the Germans directly, I've got a patient and German defense magazine coming out, you got to hit troops and whatever that number is to be able to generate most of the combat power for conventional defensive Europe. Look, we can still buy a little bit of I think Air Force, capacity, space capacity, that kind of thing to help any European fight, of course, our nuclear deterrent, but I mean, this isn't completely unsustainable situation. I think we, we have to, you know, look at that in the face the same time we need to put pressure on the Japanese and the Chinese. Excuse me, the Japanese that's wants to do more. So that we can mitigate the simultaneous problem, which is very, very real. But I guess my point of view is I don't think there's any way we're going to be able to have a simultaneous, we can mitigate the dilemma, but it's going to remain. And in that context, I really want to make sure that we get China in Asia, right. And I'll take risk in the second in a second theater. And then really, we should, in my view, and some of you may have heard me say this, if you're not working on denial of China, of China, in the western Pacific, sustain the nuclear deterrent or a more cost efficient way to do counterterrorism, I think you should be getting looking for a new job, whether in the military route, that's the level of prioritization we need to have and I you know, both across across administration's I'm not sure we're there. But that makes the that the need to focus on the greater Thanks.



Lt Gen (Ret.) Dave Deptula 35:44

Okay. Well, thank you both. For your insightful remarks, we're now going to dig into some of the points that you raised in greater detail. But I cannot stop, I have to come. I have to make a couple of comments. Jim, very much appreciate your points. And in particular, I'll raise the one that, you know, when we talk about the pillars of national security, the dine model, the diplomacy information, military and economic peace. It's interesting that we have cabinet level agencies to deal with three out of that three out of the four. But we don't have an even have a sub agency to work the information piece. And I know it's a subject for an entirely different discussion. But that is one that is absolutely critical, because we have information being used against us as a weapon by the Chinese and the Russians all the time. The bridge with respect to your comments, you know, I agree. And I mean, overall, the subject that we're dealing with, is the department writ large relative to our adversaries, is underfunded. It's a huge argument, the balance between guns versus butter is one that goes back a long way. But I think we need to begin discussing more and more and more, what are the consequences for our domestic economy if we lose in the next major regional conflict? Because that's what we're approaching. And I'm afraid that might be what it takes to wake up the nation to the importance to to adequately fund our military challenges, because I don't think people are aware of the significant rapid

acceleration of the capabilities of the Chinese. So with that, let me now transition a bit to expand on some of the issue that we're already raised bridge. As I mentioned, in the opening, you're one of the principal authors of the 2018, national defense strategy. If you look back on that strategy three and a half years later, what would you say still works well, and what might you change or update, given how things have played out?

E

Elbridge Colby 38:03

Thanks, Dave. I mean, I think, actually, I think the protraction issue is the critical one. I think we did make hard choices, obviously, the strategy itself. I mean, I think Mark used my testimony and can SAAS from 19, which hopefully gives people a clear insight into what we're talking about. I think one of the biggest issues that we weren't able to really get at that we talked about a bit, but was this time time question. You know, where the third offset, which I, you know, is a big fan of in a lot of ways, but it was very long term oriented, and also very technology oriented. I think one of the things we want to do with the 2018 NDS and Secretary Mattis in particular was pullback that that very long term focus. And I think you see that question now with a reaction to PDI and capes apparent view on on some of these foreign investments. And I think Matt's question in the chat as well. I mean, my view is we need to cover down in the near to medium term, because there may be a window of vulnerability, even as there's long term very serious danger, it's possible China will collapse or have plenty. I'm not betting on it. And I think you're right, Dave, that, you know, I mean, one of the one of the Well, one of the biggest frustrations I have in 2018. And yes, I wish it could be more open. You know, I mean, we need that clarion call of not only to ourselves, but to our allies, which I think the message got through but it could have been could have been clearer. So the near term long term thing, and I think that's their their hard choices. I mean, do we you know, run defense system, right. I mean, we need airbase defense, obviously, we need you know, command post offense, but is a just the right system or, you know, whatever Exactly. It comes pitching, it's a hard call, but I mean, we can't leave ourselves vulnerable in the near term. But other than that, I think you know, look, I I'm biased somebody who's accused me yesterday of being a stick in the mud, I guess on that one I you know, I think we I think we did all right, but I mean, strategy is it's it's obviously sound like a fortune cookie, but it's it's sort of a waypoint. You know, I mean, it's always changing and read is adapting and brain Biggest other period Oh, sorry to go on. But I think the thing I'm thinking about a lot is how do we how do we do the allies and partners in a better way? We've tried I you know, we've done passive aggressive we've done berating now we're trying, you know, sweetness and light. You know, it, I'm not sure it moves the needle that much one way or the other. But we got to get our allies to do more. I mean, we can't have Japan 1%. We can't have Germany barely above 1%. But let's, let's figure out a better way to do that. That's, that's a, that's a more integrated question. But critical.



Lt Gen (Ret.) Dave Deptula 40:30

Yeah, no. And if I may, you know, back to the issue of the challenges that we all recognize in terms of not having sufficient US funding, a potential solution is one that you just hit on. And that's to rely on our allies to a greater degree and get them further integrated into collective defense, if you will. But I know that's a whole nother, you know, bag of worms. I just also want to highlight the fact that both of you raised in Matt, also, the near term challenges that we have, but if you go and you look at the current budget submission, what do we do? What are the services? Do they raid their munitions accounts to free up money to invest in other stuff? Sorry, okay, Jim, the national defense strategy commission that made the statement A while back about needing three to 5% annual real growth rate to support that 2018 national defense strategy. And now we've seen the Biden administration's first budget request, which essentially, it's flat in real terms. And it's pretty unlikely the defense budgets going to grow over the next couple of years. It's interesting that the fight app was not included in the current release. What are your thoughts on how this year's budget request aligns with the the 18 national defense strategy and what might it signal in the way of changing priorities in the next?



Dr. Jim Miller 42:01

Dave, I just make three quick points. The first is that Perhaps unsurprisingly, given where I've come from, I see a lot of good in the Biden administration defense budget, the prioritization of home defense including nuclear deterrence, including Homeland Defense, with a next generation interceptor. These are foundational capabilities. And for the Homeland Defense job, no one else will do that for us. We can't ask our allies to do that we need to do that, right. So protecting those areas, including within the triad and national defense is fundamentally important. It grows hypersonics it grows ioser, gross command and control. Those are all positive. I see it as a downpayment in many of these areas. And now I'll be my other two comments are somewhat less positive. We are not accelerating long range strike. munitions and supporting is our commanding control as we not only as we could, but as we need to. And just to be clear, we're talking about additive here, defeating one fait accompli for us ACC Manik criteria, the ability to kill 350 ships or 2500, tanks and armored vehicles. We are so far short of that today in either theater. It is appalling. And that deserves to be first priority. I agree with bridge. The protracted conflict is largely additive because it's significantly about long range strike, defeating a second fait accompli is significantly additive, because it's significantly about long range strike, including in all cases in a very active a to AD environment where you're going to have attrition as report points out. So there is a need for a significant reorientation, I hope that they continue in reviews will, will highlight this point and put a lot of resources to getting after the capability for long range strike in an A to D environment in the first 72 hours. I don't think we need new concepts and

experimentations I don't think this I don't think we need a roles and missions debate on this. I think we need to buy a lot more capability and deploy it. And what that means my third point is okay, if you're gonna spend 10s, many 10s of billions of dollars, perhaps get into triple digit toward 100 plus billion dollars on these sets of capabilities, long range strike munitions, ASR command control and making it cyber and space resilient. And you're going to grow the budget a lot, and or you're going to make some very difficult choices. And I think that that, that means that getting agreement on the hill is going to be fundamentally important. Because even if we were at the three to 5% NDS levels, we still have hard choices and without that we have even harder choices. And to me, it means hard choices within each of the services. And here I differ slightly and that I would take risk on fourth Gen air to ramp On fifth generica sustained a bomber force as because they're bigger bigger trucks. I'll take I want to have a non stealthy truck I want it to be a big one it's really hard to you know, the Navy is attempting to grow its its surface combatants. And it did take some initial steps with with LCS to, to bring it out that a ship that's launching aircraft or missiles is going to be a big fat juicy target in a great power conflict and we need to focus much more on undersea and obviously on army for structure, some very hard choices to make, and they can't be made willy nilly and they need to be if you will mate with a scalpel not with a hacksaw. It's okay fine, but they need to be substantial and sustained over time to create a wedge that makes room for these other investments that we absolutely know that we need to deter great power aggression.

M

Mark Gunzinger 45:51

Hey, Jim, Mark here real quick. on the roles and missions and on the new operating concepts. I agree with you. We need decisions and not just more prolonged reviews and development of theoretical concepts that take three years and never make any progress. Those are vehicles decisions. Yes, but I agree we cannot wait to do the kinds of things you're talking about your increased resources, all those kinds of capabilities. We need a bridging strategy that starts that now and the others will come on Air and Missile Defense in particular. DOD has to sort out who is going to defend a Ford theater airbases or not going to be able to generate the kind of combat power we need to defeat fait accompli etc.

L

Lt Gen (Ret.) Dave Deptula 46:36

Alright, thanks, gentlemen. Let me give you both. One more before we open it up to the audience. So this is for both of you. Jevon bridge, recently completed g7 summit serves as a reminder that a key us strategic advantage as partners and allies, both of you have hit on that before, what could the united states do to rely more on the capabilities provided by our allies and partners? And you know, I think I already know you some of you touched

on this, you know, should they contribute more to offset some of these some of our militaries capability and capacity shortfalls? either one of you.

D

Dr. Jim Miller 47:25

Okay, Bridge, I'll go first, and then you can augment, correct and amend as you see fit. Again, I say I'd say three things here. First, is that the political relationships are fundamentally important. I think President Biden's trip to NATO is a good start having Secretary of State and secdef blinking in Austin, go to Seoul and Tokyo early on is a good start. I expect this administration will follow through there. And part of that political relationship is asking the hard questions. As hard asks, you need to invest more. Taiwan needs to do more to improve its resilience to cyber and sabotage, for example. Germany needs to not just increase its defense budget, but increase its capabilities, in my view, and so on. So that's the one thing too is that is that we can understand that there's a little opportunity or significant opportunity for a division of labor here in that the US has unique capability to bring not just global assets, but space, cyberspace, high end electronic warfare, assets to bear as long as as well as strike capacity that can both some of which can be within the bubble, the mobile fuel, but much of which can come from outside, and so be more survivable. And so thinking about those allied concepts, as well. And since I've raised the issue earlier about dealing with unconventional warfare, say this is particularly important that our allies and partners step up their efforts on unconventional warfare fundamentally, that's first and foremost, that's a political informational fight, they need to do better, we can need to work with them and help them but they need to do better. And third, you know, I was part of the export control reform effort under Secretary Gates, I felt at the time we got about a half a loaf. I think that that the part that we got has shrunk over time, we need to be able to export the most not just f 35, but many more of our high very high end systems to our allies. And the reality that, you know, only overstated a tiny bit, the reality that the Chinese are stealing the technology from any of them. And then we turn around and tell our allies, we can't have partners that they can't have it or that they're going to back have a you know, three year process just doesn't make any sense. We've got to do better on that. And that will involve not just selling them things but working with them and sharing some technologies and taking some risk in that regard. So that we're aiming to not protect everything but only protected crown jewels. And we're aiming to succeed by moving faster on technology and innovation, not by not by having a giant set of elements in our in our force that our allies can access. I'll stop there.

E

Elbridge Colby 50:18

Yeah, Thanks, David. I mean, I think, you know, I think the scale of the geopolitical

challenge is so grave that it requires a fundamental overhaul of our of our sort of defense, our whole sort of political military strategy, certainly since the end of the Cold War, which basically rests on the United States clearly at the top, and everybody's sort of subordinate, if not totemic elements. And people like Jim Thomas have been saying this for years. But I think the key point here is the primary theatres got to be the western Pacific. And they're, you know, Japan is a third largest economy in the world. And fourth, depending on how you measure it, we need them to be like West Germany, in in the Cold War, which is to say, a very robust conventional military dedicated to collective defense. Dave, as you as you said, there's no more than the Japanese when at the end that we wouldn't be in, why don't we have a Combined Forces Command they should double their defense spending yesterday, they should spend on things that are relevant for a western Pacific scenario. I mean, if Taiwan falls, I don't see how we stay in the Senkaku Islands. I mean, it's like a hop, skip and a jump away from Taiwan. So I mean, my view is we actually have a crisis with our in our US Japan relationship now, because we don't seem to recognize that we're in a crisis, which means that we are in a crisis. That's like the real crux. And same with Taiwan. And I think we're German in Europe, we should, as much as possible be basically having what actually was kind of Eisenhower's original vision, some extent, which is Europeans basically performing the conventional defense, and we can provide the kind of, you know, boutique, sort of high end stuff that Jim was mentioning, but I think that's a fundamental mountain, we should open the floodgates. And then I think, you know, one of the things that I think the Pentagon was starting to do, somewhat belatedly, but I think commendably at the end of the Trump administration, that guidance for the development of allies and partners, let's pool force development capability, let's think about posture and operational concepts, and executing plans as much as possible to get particularly with countries like Australia and Japan, that really are going to be integrated with us. And I think that's the basic model. And it requires a different attitude, where we really aren't the sort of unit poll anymore, doesn't mean that that's not, that's not lashing our, you know, our backs, that's just a reality. And now we got to adapt to that to deal with it, the new the new battlefields that work that we're dealing with, so, okay.



Lt Gen (Ret.) Dave Deptula 52:26

All right. Well, gentlemen, thanks very much for your insights, I think of comments reinforced the need for defense planners, Congress and the American public, to have an open and honest discussion about ends Ways and Means, or else risk of strategic insolvency. Now, Jim, and bridge on behalf of Mitchell Institute, and all of AFA, we wish you the very best to help shape the path forward in this era of ever increasing challenges. And as I promised Bridge up front, for those of you who are hearing more about his perspectives, do a pre order of his upcoming book, the strategy of denial, American defense in an age great power conflict. In it, it talks about why and how America's defense

strategy needs to change in light of China's power and ambition and that some of the stuff that we talked about today. It'll be coming out the middle of September. So with that, let's open it up to questions from the audience. Please state your name and association you're affiliated with when I call on you. Let's start off with Steve tremble. Steve.

S

Steve Trimble 53:44

Yes. Hi, Steve Trimble Aviation Week. Thank you for that conversation. So on the Pacific side, and on long range strike capacity, you know, we've seen over the past year South Korea, you know, with the agreement on ballistic missile indigenous ballistic missile development, Japan's investing in hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise missiles. And Australia has just joined in with sitefire for hypersonic cruise missiles. How much does that relieve that? That long range strike munition gap? Or to what extent can you build it into a four structure plan like this? And then secondly, it with the export reform comments that you were talking about during increasing access? Would you add the B 21. to that list of exportable items if say Australia or Japan or South Korea wanted to afford it?

M

Mark Gunzinger 54:34

Steve, Mark Gunzinger here all start very quickly. It's great to see our allies and partners making investments in those kinds of conditions. I see them as additive and complimentary. I do not see that they are going to significantly reduce our requirements. And we shouldn't use that as an excuse to not pump up our investments in long-range strike capabilities, including of course, munitions. As for the beat 21, all security issues aside, I think it'd be great to see, for example, United Kingdom to have a long-range strike capability once again.

L

Lt Gen (Ret.) Dave Deptula 55:16

Anyone else care to comment on?

E

Elbridge Colby 55:20

Well, I think I think the only thing I'd add is, this is where the integration with the Allies is really necessary. If you can't, if you can't command control, if you don't, if you're not prepared, you're not positioned the right place. It doesn't do much for you. I mean, I think that's where, you know, the Australians are really good. guinea pig is not the right term for our Australian friends, but you know, somebody to really try to work out the kinks with, but I think that's where we would want to get with it. The Australians in the Japanese and the Koreans, hopefully, but you know, there's more political difficulty there needs to be China.



Dr. Jim Miller 55:49

Yeah, just a quick comment, I agree that it's helpful that our allies are developing more strike capabilities, but fundamentally agree with God's of our requirement is still very substantial. We're well short. And we should be looking for both creative basing arrangements for B 20. ones, including UK and Australia. And have that conversation with our allies first, and then have conversation about whether they're interested in buying into the program as well.



Lt Gen (Ret.) Dave Deptula 56:20

Very good. Okay. How about John Tirpak?



John Tirpak 56:24

Yes. Good morning. Thanks, gentlemen. The Air Force has been pushing for roles and missions debate on just these topics. For a number of years, there's been a lot of resistance even from General Hyten. What do you think is the reason for the resistance at that level? And realistically, what are the odds that this is some sometime going to happen?



Mark Gunzinger 56:49

Mark here, I'll tell you that I helped co lead the department's last roles and missions if you which essentially came to nod for the same reason why a number of them have and that is they challenge services, rice bowls, and the challenge programs of record. That's exactly what needs to happen today, they need to be challenged. I'm all for a focused, not overall sweeping two year long review, but a focus review. Better yet. I'm all in favor of some decisions and some critical roles and missions areas that, frankly, have been studied to death over the years.



Dr. Jim Miller 57:33

I would just pile them in here I have coming from a somewhat similar perspective as guns, I think but phrasing a little differently. I'm more interested in the reality of what happens with force structure and capabilities and the operational capability of US military than having a debate over over specific roles and responsibilities. We know that we're short in critical areas. We know the type of capabilities including farmers with long range munitions include an undersea warfare that needs to be ramped up. Let's do it.



Lt Gen (Ret.) Dave Deptula 58:09

Okay, very good. I'm going to switch over to the chat section on questions. Here's one from Steven Shankle. Quote, integrated deterrence is becoming a new buzzword, not a bad concept. And we seem to talk about conventional forces separate and apart from nuclear forces in recapitalizing them, do you think there needs to be a better integrated understanding of the connection between nuclear forces and conventional capabilities in the deterrence equation, unquote, I'm gonna jump in here real quick, up front and say, if we continue to keep on underfunding our conventional forces, as has been the case, we're gonna have to start considering potentially the use of lower yield nuclear weapons as a means to offset our conventional weakness. Okay, over to you bridge. Jim. Yeah. Well, Dave,



Elbridge Colby 59:08

I actually agree with you. I don't think that's a good place. I mean, I assume you don't either outright. I know you don't. But I think you're right. I mean, I think either that or, or backing off or something horizontal escalation strategies don't work. I'll say I mean, I think, you know, Gonzo, I think and and Lucas, we're getting at this and the attractive point, that's where it really becomes most relevant, something I talked about my book, and thanks, again, for the convention. It's managing that, that that threshold, I think this is where we can pick up on some of the stuff in the late 70s and 80s. We're thinking about conventional warfare under the new shadow. But were part of the appeal of the kind of punishment end of the denial, denial, punishment is that it's more sort of readily perceived as limited. You know that what we want to do is and it's about war termination. We want to end the war, basically with our defense, perimeter restore. We're not trying to occupy China, we're not going to do regime change or any of that stuff, for multiple reasons. But so we're going to really need to think about that. Because obviously, the 20 ones are gonna carry conventional and nuclear, they're going to be going all over places if we're successful if we're lucky. So we're, you know, this is, this is an area actually back to Dave's original question where I didn't feel like we got as far as I had hoped. But where we signal in the end is to focus on escalation management, not escalation control, but not ignoring the problem, or not being a lot of the conversation, particularly Academy, I think, tends to be spooked in a sense, they they say, Oh, well, if you go hit the Chinese mainland, there's a risk of nuclear escalation. Well, yeah, the first service but if we're not willing to hit the Chinese mainland, we're going to lose. So Rob is going to have the Chinese mainland, the question is where how with what signaling that kind of thing and that needs to be this is where the civilians and the uniforms really need to be in, in a kind of a vigorous discussion or debate. So I think that's true, you know, to the last administration's credit, I mean, conventional nuclear integration was a big thing. People like what Greg Weaver really know this stuff. So hopefully, that's continuing, I will say a little bit of, I don't want it to

sound like a cheap shot, the integrated deterrence moniker worries me, because like my experience and my sense in the department, especially given the constraints and the severity is, let's keep it simple, stupid. The great thing about the Rand ACC manic standard is if we can do that, we'll be okay. And everybody can kind of work towards it. It's, um, there's a better way of thinking about it, you know, in a platonic universe, but in a large organization, like the defense establishment, we need people to be focused. And when I hear integrated, sounds like Well, hey, you know, and to Gonzos point, well, that that thing, you know, yes, my thing, my platform, or my force, posture won't help you in your denial, the fetta complete, but it's a it's the integrating, it helps reassure allies or it, you know, there's a horizontal escalation thing. And it's like, No, no, no, no, we're not, we can't do that anymore. We got to just be are you killings ships in the Strait, and I realized that's too reductive. But it's that level that I think we need to be at, at this point, given how bad things are and how short we are, money wise

D

Dr. Jim Miller 1:02:06

Few quick points. I like the integrated deterrence concept. And I see it applicable primarily to information and political warfare, gray zone conflict, countering coercion, keeping allied cohesion and so forth. We still need the military capabilities that Brett was talking about the strike capabilities and ASR and so fourth, and second day, I think your proposal is a bad idea whose time I hope never comes. And it it reinforces. And your I think your point is that if it's going to come because we're unwilling to step up to the long range, conventional strike stuff, let's face it, if that's the choice of presidents gonna have loser, go nuclear, let's face it, let's not pretend it's otherwise, it's a hell of a lot better choice to build the capabilities to effectively defeat if necessary, show that capability for deterrence by denial, and have a credible deterrence through conventional means. I think, my guess is is empty and heads not that we all agree on that point it the stakes are high.

L

Lt Gen (Ret.) Dave Deptula 1:03:04

Well, thank you, Jim. And I'll be perfectly transparent. What I'm trying to do is get people's attention. Okay, if you don't find this capability to allow us to defer deter, and then if necessary, fight and win conventionally, then we're gonna have to start considering low yield news. Maybe that might get people's attention anyway. Well, and I sorry,

E

Elbridge Colby 1:03:27

I'll just say I don't that's not, that's not the end of it. I mean, we're gonna go there. And that doesn't solve our it's not a magic solution. I know you I know, you know, that



Lt Gen (Ret.) Dave Deptula 1:03:34

I know it's not looking for is get somebodys attention. In fact, because until we get realization in the American public in the Congress, we're going to continue to tread water. So with that happy point, ladies and gentlemen, we've come to the end of Mitchell's rollout of our report: Building a Force that Wins: Recommendations for the 2022 National Defense Strategy. It really was a special honor to have you both bridge and Jim, with us today. Thank you so much for joining in from all of us at Mitchell Institute to you both and everyone in the audience. Have a great aerospace power kind of day.



Mark Gunzinger 1:04:21

Thank you, gentlemen.