

052419 Air Force Association Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, Reserve Officers Association, and National Defense Industrial Association Capitol Hill Forum with Frank Miller, Principal at the Scowcroft Group, on “Deterrence, Modernization, and Arms Control”

(For additional information on AFA/NDIA/ROA seminars contact Peter Huessy at phuessy@afa.org).

MR. PETER HUESSY: Good morning, everybody, and welcome to the next in our series of seminars on nuclear deterrence, arms control, missile defense, proliferation and defense policy. Thank you for coming out. I know everybody in this town has left for the Memorial Day weekend, so you guys are the hard core. I want to welcome our friends from the Japanese embassy who are here today, also a guest here from the Russian embassy.

Frank Miller is our speaker. He is a long-term friend and colleague, formerly with the Department of Defense and OSD and the White House. He is now a Principal at the Scowcroft Group and will be addressing us this morning.

Our next three breakfasts are the 4th, 6th and 7th, I believe, of June. You get a week, next week, off. We have none. We’ll get you that information. Mainly it’s going to be on China and Iran and missiles and nuclear weapons.

Frank, on behalf of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, NDIA and ROA, who are our co-sponsors with cooperative groups with this, I want to thank you for being here. Would you give a warm welcome to Frank Miller?

(Applause).

MR. FRANK MILLER: Thank you very much, Peter. I guess, given your remarks, I should summon up Henry V. We have this band of brothers, and I guess we should say band of brothers and sisters. Welcome.

Another year has gone by, actually I did this breakfast exactly about a year ago. I do this sort of annually, which is good. As always, it’s a good time to pause and take a retrospective look at the world of arms control and modernization. So today I want to start by going back in time.

Even in 2010, as New START was being negotiated and ratified, and 2011 as it entered into force, we were aware that Russia was not complying with several arms control treaties or agreements. But because the United States had hit a reset button, the Obama administration wasn’t particularly concerned. We knew Putin had lashed out at the West, at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, and we thought that was just for domestic consumption. We knew Putin was beginning to rebuild his armed forces after

getting a bloody nose in Georgia in 2008. We weren't too concerned about that either, because we know Russia's military had deteriorated after union dissolved and that it couldn't possibly be reconstituted to pose a threat to NATO.

And we knew that the ambitious rising star, Xi Jinping, was climbing the ladder of the Chinese Communist Party, but we were convinced that China had evolved largely into a competitive trading partner. It had sharp elbows, but a partner nevertheless.

Wow, what a difference a few years make. What do we see now? We see the Helsinki Final Act violated, Ukraine invaded, Crimea annexed, the Vienna Document violated, the Open Skies Treaty violated, the INF Treaty violated, the Chemical Weapons Convention violated.

We see a major nuclear force buildup in Russia and China. In Russia we see non-treaty accountable strategic systems highlighted in speeches and gala presentations, and now in development. Nikita Khrushchev's ghost is apparently now in charge of writing talking points for Czar Vladimir and his senior officials on nuclear weapons.

In the Pacific, China has the most aggressive and largest ballistic missile development and deployment program in the entire world. Artificial islands have arisen from the depths of the South China Sea. But as Xi Jinping assured President Obama in the Rose Garden, they weren't to be militarized, until suddenly they were, and then they became a part of a legal claim that the South China Sea, a key waterway through which 80 percent of Asia's trade passes, was an inland Chinese lake. And both Russia and China are in the middle of deploying modernized strategic triads and new non-strategic nuclear systems, and in Russia's case building exotic new strategic nuclear systems.

With respect to ourselves, the United States, our deterrent remains essentially as it was in 2010 or 2011. It's awaiting modernization, but as yet it is simply growing older until the proposed replacement systems begin to enter the force in the mid- to late-2020s. So, we need to talk this morning about arms control and modernization, and their intersection, and to take stock of where we are with each.

Let's begin with New START. There is much gnashing of teeth and rending of garments in the disarmament community about the possibility of New START not being extended, as it is currently written. Those who are asking to examine rationally the pros and cons of a simple extension, me among them, have been labeled extremists by that community. So I guess, let me become an extremist for a moment and pursue some fundamental issues with you.

As I wrote recently elsewhere, Presbyterians, like me, are familiar with what are known as "the great ends of the church,": those six missions which the church seeks to accomplish. The arms control and disarmament community, which has many of its own canons, could use a similar great ends statement in order that its members might remember what they should be seeking to accomplish. The purpose of arms control is not, and should not be, to preserve existing agreements.

The purpose of arms control is to create and preserve agreements that continue to remain meaningful and viable. Arms control agreements must meet two goals. First, they must be faithfully observed by all of the signatories. Second, they should provide for the national security requirements of all of the signatories.

Arms control treaties fail because they do not meet either or both of these goals. Looking at the compliance record, we know that the Russian Federation is an untrustworthy partner. As you know, this morning, right now, Russia is in violation of at least nine separate arms control treaties or agreements, and you know what they are so I won't list them.

An arms control agreement in which one party is in compliance and the other is cheating does not constitute effective arms control. It represents unilateral constraint. Moscow's record of noncompliance betrays the Kremlin's utter contempt not only for the agreements it is violating, but also for the Western governments with whom it entered into those agreements.

Coupled with President's Putin's Khrushchev-like bellicose rhetoric, the dangerous military activities and exercises he supports, and the massive rearmament program he presides over, the odds that Russia will return to compliance with its obligations are slight. But, the disarmament community is quick to point out that Russia remains in compliance with its obligations under New START. That community bemoans the fact that should the treaty expire in early 2021 without extension or replacement, it will end the last remaining arms treaty between the United States and Russia.

Moreover, they fear that this would initiate a new nuclear arms race and usher in a new dangerous era in Russia's relationship with the West. But, let's examine those two assertions. As we have discussed many times in this forum, the notion that New START's demise will produce a new nuclear arms race is risible.

Russia is in the midst of an eight year long modernization program for all of its nuclear forces, from the short-range to the intercontinental. In contrast, the United States will not field a new strategic nuclear system until the middle of the next decade.

Russia is, on a near constant basis, seeking to blackmail NATO nations by threatening them with nuclear attack. It is seeking to subvert their democracies through cyber-attacks, social media manipulation and forging alliances with anti-NATO populist parties. It is rebuilding its entire military establishment. Short of launching a military attack on, or forcing a military confrontation with a NATO member, it is really difficult to imagine a more dangerous set of Russian policies.

But, as it is clear from public statements by senior officials, the Russian government appears quite interested in extending New START as it is written. Why wouldn't it be? Extending New START would continue limiting U.S. strategic forces

once the modernization programs begin to start placing new units in the field by the mid-to late-2020s, precisely at a time when Russia may begin to be facing real financial constraints on building new forces itself.

But, while New START caps traditional strategic forces, it does not address the threat posed by the continuously growing Russian arsenal of shorter and mid-range systems, including the INF Treaty violating cruise missile which Russia is deploying today. Nor does it address the exotic Russian strategic systems, such as the Kanyon Trans-Oceanic Torpedo, which Moscow is building. So, if you return to first principles, that arms control agreements are supposed to provide for the national security requirements of all of the signatories, New START provided a necessary, but not sufficient, protection for the United States and our allies.

All of this said, the disarmament community reminds us that the compromise between the Obama administration and Congress in 2010 linked ratification of New START with Hill approval of modernizing U.S. strategic forces, notwithstanding that many of the modernization programs were then slipped several years to the right. A prime example being the vital Columbia-class SSBN. Those same people today are calling on the Congress to threaten to withdraw support from continuing the modernization program unless New START is extended in its current form.

What's wrong with that? Well, first and most importantly, we have now reached the point where any additional delays to the modernization of our triad forces will result in systems being retired either without replacement forever, or without replacement for some extended period of time. Those systems are simply aging out.

We have heard these warnings before, from STRATCOM commanders and secretaries of Defense, and they are exactly right. So, I need someone to explain to me the logic that America's and our allies' security must be put at risk at a time when we know that our potential enemies, Russia and China, continue to deploy new nuclear systems. Second, as I indicated, while a simple extension of New START may well be in Russia's security interests, it does not fully address the new Russian nuclear threats increasing facing the United States and our allies.

But all of this said, I think there is a deal to be had. If we had a new treaty that would extend New START on the condition that negotiations begin immediately to replace it with a verifiable agreement that limits all -- I'll say again -- all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, such a treaty would meet the goals for an arms control agreement set out at the beginning of this commentary. The United States would have to make clear, however, that its continued adherence for each of the five extended years would depend annually upon success in the negotiations on the new all-encompassing treaty. This would remove the concern that Moscow could stall or prolong the talks indefinitely.

If Moscow seeks to impose constraints on the U.S. modernization program, such a treaty would be in its interest as well as in ours and our allies. Whether Putin can clearly

see to act in his own interest, however, remains to be seen. And those for whom my main message is for this morning, before I turn to your question, I'd like to deal with one very specific issue.

Congressman Cooper of Tennessee, the experienced chair of the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, said something very peculiar on Wednesday. Regarding the W-76-2 low yield Trident warhead, Mr. Cooper said, and I quote, "I think most people, Republican or Democrat, are worried about anything that might endanger the survivability of a nuclear submarine," end quote.

That surprises me, it really does. The underlying assumption for the comment is that a U.S. SSBN would never fire only one or two SLBMs, fearing that it would be located, attacked and sunk as a result. It also assumes that deploying the W-76-2 creates the first instance in which we could contemplate such a limited launch.

Many of you present today are fully aware that the United States incorporated limited options into its deterrent plans beginning in the mid-1970s. As I wrote in an op-ed about a year ago, quote, "It would be reasonable to assume that plans assigned to U.S. ballistic missile submarines include these small options," close quote. For reasons that I can go into in detail during the questions and answers, it should be clear that the Navy has full confidence that an SSBN will remain fully survivable even after launching only a portion of the missiles it carries.

So, the congressman's concerns really have nothing to do with the new low yield warhead, and I hope someone assures him that our SSBNs will continue to remain survivable and able to fill the full range of their deterrent missions. This will certainly continue well into the future, as the Columbia-class boats enter the fleet.

With that, let me stop and turn to your questions.

(Applause).

MR. MICHAEL GORDON: Your argument is that after New START Treaty approach can be adjusted to include all these new weapons. I have two questions. One, you didn't really address the verification and monitoring and data exchange dimensions of New START, the inspections and BCC and all that sort of stuff. That information is of interest not just to the so-called arms control community, but to the Defense Department and the intelligence community.

From your perspective, given all your years working on this, how useful are those verification and monitoring arrangements? Would you be prepared to forego them if you couldn't get the sort of New START agreement you would like, an agreement that would include all nuclear weapons? I think that would be the risk.

Then secondly, if you want to include the Russian tactical nuclear systems, one can assume that the Russian side would come back and ask the British and French

nuclear deterrents be included. They're going to have their own say. What would be the tradeoff that you could envision for this new arms control agreement?

MR. MILLER: I'll try and take your questions in the order you presented them. I think a treaty which purportedly constrains the nuclear threat to the United States and our allies, but in fact does not do so, is not in our security interest. If the Russian Federation is allowed to produce new systems that are exotic, like Kanyon and other systems, if it is allowed to continue to produce INF systems and other short-range systems to reinforce its "escalate to win" strategy, then I don't think that New START in its existing form serves our national security.

I'd make an analogy, knowing that analogies are always flawed. As you know, SALT I capped the strategic nuclear systems of the United States and Soviet Union. With SALT I and with that cap, the Soviet Union began deploying the SS-20 in large numbers, causing a great crisis in the alliance. In a similar way, New START does the same thing. It caps the traditional strategic forces and allows Russia to build out underneath the treaty and outside of the treaty.

So, if you're talking about security interests, I don't think that New START, as it is written, serves ours. I think that the data exchange is a confidence building measure for the IC, but at the same time, if you ask me if I have to give up that information and go back to relying more on traditional spy craft and traditional intelligence, which we've gotten away from for years -- we've gotten really lazy, as you know -- yes, I'd do that. I don't think the cost of knowing that they're currently not cheating today because we did an inspection, is worth people believing we have a treaty that caps the Russian threat and really doesn't.

I passed over your third question, right?

MR. GORDON: If you're going to cover all tactical systems -- (off mic) -- what would you anticipate the Russian side would ask for? What would be the actual tradeoff -- the British, the French?

MR. MILLER: I don't think the allies -- the British and the French -- of course, we'll never negotiate on behalf of our two allies. The Russians might ask for missile defense. I mean, we don't have to negotiate, Michael, if our terms aren't met.

I'd make two points in that regard. I'm assuming that one of the reasons that the Russian government is so interested in extending New START is to cap our modernization when it really kicks into gear. You know it will kick into gear in the mid-2020s, and that's a time when Russian finances are probably going to be strained. So an all-out arms race is something they can't afford.

The other thing is, cutting the Soviet ICBM throw-weight by 50 percent was non-negotiable, until they signed up to it in START I. Eliminating all INF was non-negotiable until they signed up to it. Eliminating all MIRVed ICBMs was non-negotiable

until they signed up to it. If we get a backbone for our negotiators, perhaps we can achieve a treaty that extends New START but really captures the threat. That would be my answer.

MR. : (Off mic) -- What would an arms race look like?

MR. MILLER: Let me do the second one first. Let me refer you -- I don't have the exact specifics with me, but if you look at the 26 pages I submitted to the House Armed Services Committee on March 26, as a prelude to my testimony, it's all there. Ash Carter, President Obama's last secretary of Defense, I quote him twice in there in 2018 and 2019. He was out of office.

He said, anybody who claims that this is creating an arms race is missing the whole point. There is an arms race, he said. It's between Russia and China, because they are fielding new nuclear systems today.

There are tens of new Russian ICBMs entering the field every year. The Russians are building and deploying two new types of SLBMs. There are three new operational Boray-class SSBNs with a fourth one that is getting ready to go. They're building new Blackjack bombers, putting them in the field. They're building new air-launched cruise missiles, and putting them in the field.

The Chinese now have five operational new SSBNs. The Chinese are putting two new types of ICBMs, mobile, in the field today. The Chinese are fielding a new SLBM.

These systems are going into the field, okay? We will not put a new strategic system in the field until, at the very earliest, the mid-2020s. That's not an arms race. They are deploying, we're not deploying. So, it's not an arms race, except between the two of them.

As to the delays, it was Congressional action. It wasn't NNSA, but it was programmatic. The Columbia slipped two years. GBSD slipped, I think. So these were slips that were worked out by Congress.

I'm not throwing any stones, I'm just saying that we had this deal and then things started slipping. The people who made the deal starting saying, we didn't. We didn't make that deal. We never signed up to modernization. So, you know, it is what it is.

MS. : Thank you for your comments, they're very clarifying. (Off mic) --

MR. MILLER: Yeah, nail me on something I wrote.

MS. : (Off mic) -- How would you see that working in real life?

MR. MILLER: Well, we could always go back to the Washington Naval Treaty of the '20s. That didn't work very well. A Chinese official, a senior deputy

undersecretary of the MFA, said this week, trilateral? Does that mean you want to come down to our levels, or do you want us to come up to your levels. That's not going to work either.

I don't know. I'm glad I'm not trying to craft and implement such a thing. I'll give you a hypothetical. Don't tell anybody in London, or they won't let me (come over?) anymore.

Hypothetically, you could get an agreement among the P5 that everybody froze at current levels. Beneath that you could work the New START extension. The flaw in that is not only that London and Paris may decide not to agree, and I may be too pessimistic, but I don't see the Chinese agreeing to a verification regime. I'm not going to get into the politics of all this, but it seems to me it will be very difficult to conceive of a U.S.-Russia-China regime now. I wish them luck, if they can come up with something, and I'm not opposing it, I'm just saying it would be really, really hard to do.

MR. : We have been talking for the last several years about this need for modernization, such that it almost seems like that's the end state that we're looking for. But given what has happened over the last 30 years where things go fallow and we're worried about pipelines in the NNSA, do you have some thoughts about how to re-architect a more sustainable nuclear weapons arsenal ?

MR. MILLER: Given the requirements of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its licensing, the costs are so high it's hard to believe we're going to ever have any new nuclear plants, which I think is a huge mistake. But set that aside. I don't think that affects where we are with NNSA.

First of all, the constraints on new warhead production are important but they're not really what I'm talking about. I'm talking about new systems. I think we're going to be okay on the warheads.

The 76-1 is complete. The standard Trident warhead has been SLEP'ed. The W-88 high yield Trident is going to be SLEP'ed. That program is underway.

Work is underway on a new replacement warhead or modernized warhead for the air-launched cruise missile/LRSO. There is work underway on a new warhead for the ICBM force for the GBSD. That work is underway.

The problem is to get the delivery systems funded, first and foremost. Second, the nuclear weapons complex has done a poor job over the last several decades in spending its money wisely to improve its infrastructure. I was a member of the Congressional panel, the so-called Mies-Augustine panel, that looked at NNSA two or three years ago. We reviewed constant, continued cost overruns and failure to do estimates on what it took to replace and modernize facilities.

If you go into many of the NNSA facilities today, they look like they did in the

1950s. At Oak Ridge they've got nets strung from the ceiling at Oak Ridge so that when the concrete falls out of the ceiling it doesn't hurt anything. This is a nuclear weapons complex?

Did you know that today, of all the nuclear weapons powers, including North Korea, the United States is the only nuclear weapons state that cannot produce a field deployable pit? I mean, seriously? So, NNSA needs to get its act together and it needs to justify to Congress the fact that it can spend its money wisely.

I think Frank Klotz -- and now especially I give great kudos to Lisa Gordon Haggerty -- are making great progress in that regard. But the failure is within NNSA to modernize its own infrastructure. It has had money, it has wasted that money. Some of it is explainable, let's use that term. You have the Defense Nuclear Safety Facilities Board requiring that the concrete had to be 30 to 50 feet deep so that you could have a guarantee that for a million years an earthquake wouldn't shake the plant. That doesn't excuse the fact that we can't today produce a field-able nuclear weapons pit. So, that's on NNSA. I think that they're coming back up on the curve. I know Lisa is very serious about doing that. Let me leave it at that.

MR. STEVE TRAYVOR (ph): Your discussion about verification reminds me of the large number of contracts of the last treaties that we've been trying to execute for the last (50 ?) years between the democracies and the totalitarian states. We've gone down the road with the WTO on trade agreements. We've gone down the road with the world court on territorial agreements. We've gone down the road trying to verify treaties associated with nuclear weapons, etcetera. It becomes a fill in the blank subject, how do you enforce the contracts? From your perspective, as we go forward now inevitably trying to develop contracts for various issues with totalitarian governments, can you just off the top of your head recommend a couple of things that we've got to be sure every time we try to come up with some way to enforce a contract, we don't end up with plan A is just swallow it or plan B is withdraw and suffer a huge PR disaster?

MR. MILLER: That's a great question. At the risk of getting into an area that I know very little to nothing about, which is trade, many of those things were written decades ago and need to be updated. Without getting into politics I think adjusting our trade relationship with China is long overdue. As I understand it, and someone will correct me if I say this incorrectly, under many WTO arrangements China is still viewed as a developing nation and gets breaks as a result. The world's second biggest economy, what's wrong with that?

But I think I would make two other points. One, during the Gorbachev-Yeltsin era START and the INF Treaty worked. The verification regimes worked. There was intrusive verification on both sides and we were very confident of what was going on.

As time went on, the Russian Federation, being a much more closed society than we, pushed for us to back off, which was probably a mistake. That brings me to my final point, which as I said in my remarks, unless both governments view these treaties as

being in their security interests, then arms control is not going to work; or trade agreements aren't going to work. So again, what would we do in an open society where properly our weapons systems and what we're going to build and buy and deploy is debated in public? I don't know. Maybe you don't engage in arms control.

But again, the Soviet Union, and now the Russian Federation, has an interest in getting their arms around some of our programs. We just have to think of ways to create sanctions or penalties where there are violations. I mean, we're not allowed to fly over Kaliningrad with our Open Skies aircraft. That's a complete, direct violation of the Open Skies Treaty. They were flying over Offutt Air Force Base last week, as I recall.

Or you have to say, as happened twice this week already, if you're going to send Blackjacks and fighter escorts and tankers into our Air Defense Identification Zones, we're going to make you pay for that. We'll find a way. It may not be in coin, the same coin.

But again, there has to be sanctions. Dangerous military agreements, something that was negotiated in -- Michael, help me -- it was Lee Butler in the late '80s, right? You don't fly fighter aircraft with 30 foot horizontal and 100 foot vertical separation from a U.S. warship. Or for the Chinese, you don't cut in front of a U.S. destroyer. We saw those games of chicken in the Cold War, but the Russians found a way to get out of that.

So again, your basic point is right and I think we do a poor job of responding. We need to get better about that.

MR. : In your March 6th testimony, apparently Chairman Cooper agrees with you. He said the other day he wants to support the triad. The chairman of the full committee doesn't.

Would you go through some of the options? Option one was getting rid of the land-based leg of the triad. The number two option was go to five submarines.

Would you deal with this issue of apparently the only scenario that is offered in the media about 99 percent of the time is the Russians are going to hit us with 1,000 warheads and take out all our Minutemen and our launch control centers, and then declare victory. That is what we have to worry about, so take away the targets and then they won't hit us.

MR. MILLER: You're trying to get me in trouble.

(Laughter).

My first response to that would be in late December the University of Alabama, the defensive end Quinnen Williams, was asked before the Oklahoma game what he thought of the Oklahoma quarterback. He started to wind up and he stopped and said,

“no, I’m good.” So my first response is, “no, I’m good.”

Look, the triad was the product of inter-service rivalry. But the ugly duckling became the swan that everybody won’t love. Why? Because the triad from both an offensive and vulnerability standpoint, presents potential enemies with insurmountable difficulties. You can’t attack each leg the same way. The mix of different azimuths and different attack profiles makes it really, really hard for an enemy to defend against it.

The first point is the triad as a concept is terribly important. And oh by the way, it it’s such a terrible idea why are Russia and China and Israel and India and Pakistan deploying triads? But, never mind, justify it on its own grounds.

The second point is that, I guess I would add to that, if you look at the Nuclear Posture Review Secretary Mattis is quoted as saying, “when I came to town I was really skeptical about a triad. I didn’t believe in a triad. I’ve been convinced.”

As a close personal friend of Jim Mattis, I’ll tell you that it is not easy to convince Jim Mattis of things. So, that’s the second point.

If you do away with 450 ICBMs, which if an enemy were to attack it would have to put one warhead against each, so there’s no doubt that there’s a massive raid underway, a minimum of 450, maybe 900, then your strategic targets are probably down to about six: Washington, Omaha, two sub bases, and depending on the alert status of the bombers three bomber bases. So the threshold for an attack and the confusion factor as to, are there missile in the air, why are there missiles in the air, a small number, what’s going on, becomes much more difficult. Again, the triad forces a potential enemy considering an attack on the United States to put a large number of warheads in the air.

That is why the land-based leg of the triad is so critically important. And oh by the way, and I will emphasize this point because it has been in U.S. guidance since PD-59. I didn’t write this in, but I wrote it in other guidance. While we maintain the capability to launch under attack, we do not rely on that for the credibility of our deterrent. But no one can be certain if they launch a massive raid on the ICBM force that we will not launch under attack.

So again, take that away and the problem of attacking the United States becomes much easier. Did I answer your question?

MR. : What about the submarines?

MR. MILLER: Five submarines.

MR. : It was proposed.

MR. MILLER: I know, I was there. I don’t want to get into personalities. U.S. Strategic Command, starting with Bob Kehler and then his successor, said that the force

that we are permitted to deploy under New START, which is not 1,550 but because of the bomber counting rules, is in the area of 2,000 to 2,100. Cecil Haney and John Hyten have said that is the force they need to fulfill U.S. deterrent requirements. I think it's a remarkable example of American democracy that independent analysts can say no, I think we only need to hit 500 targets.

Okay, you know, that individual is entitled to his or her own opinion. But you have a series of Strategic Command commanders whose job every day is to worry about strategic deterrence, who say this is what we need to do to carry out national guidance, national guidance being that created by the president and the secretary of Defense or the chairman. Again, people can have their opinions.

MR. : (Off mic).

MR. MILLER: That's my speculation. We don't know what the Russians really think.

MR. : (Off mic).

MR. MILLER: If the treaty is in force then the United States cannot exceed the 1,550 limits. When we have hot production lines producing submarines and ICBMs and new bombers and new cruise missiles, we can build as many as we want. We can build as many as the Congress will authorize, right? If there is no treaty we could likely do that.

So, if there's a 1,550 cap we'll have to live with that. If there's no 1,550 cap we'll build whatever we feel we need. In that sense, it caps the traditional strategic forces. It doesn't do anything about the Kanyon, the Avangard and all these other strategic systems that the Russians are building. So, you know, that's part of the nuclear threat to us.

The INF missile is a threat to Japan. The INF missile is a threat to Western Europe. We don't propose to develop a similar nuclear system. We don't propose to return to the Cold War to try to mirror image the Russian bloated arsenal of non-strategic nuclear forces. We're going to deal with that with the W-76-2, the low yield Trident, in the deterrent context.

But, there should be some bounds on that threat. Or, if there aren't, then we should be free to do whatever it is we feel we need to do.

MR. : (Off mic).

MR. MILLER: The current modernization plan builds to the 1,550 limit.

MR. : (Off mic).

MR. MILLER: Right.

MR. : It would appear that President Putin -- (off mic). Do you think that's the case, and if so, what would you rather do?

MR. MILLER: It's sort of what you hear off stage. I guess I'd move to do something I would almost never do, which is to quote Henry Kissinger. So, I do so with great peril.

I think it was in the '70s after he was out of office, of course, because Kissinger is always much more honest when he's out of office than when he's in office. He said something to the effect of, "What in the name of God is strategic superiority?" I don't know what Mr. Putin wants to do in terms of size.

Making the rubble bounce is hardly a useful strategy, unless one found that an American president in a crisis is told he's got 6,000 weapons and you've got 3,000, so we have to give up. That is possible. But if those 3,000 weapons are capable of destroying all of the critical targets that the Russian government relies upon to control a post-war world, then it doesn't really matter, does it?

What I worry about with the Russians is two things. I worry that in the past 10 to 15 years Russian military doctrine, suggests that in the event of a conventional war which Russia is losing, that they would resort to battlefield use to end the conflict, escalate and win. They have built the weapons systems necessary to make that doctrine real, and they've exercised that doctrine.

They have done so in the belief that we lack an appropriate counter. So, there is the first question of miscalculation, that we don't have a response. Otherwise, why would you invest in all those capabilities? The W-76-2 is our response and it will be fielded and it will be a useful deterrent to "escalate to win."

The second concern I have about miscalculation uses an analogy, perhaps flawed, back to the '30s. When Hitler occupied the Rhineland, Britain and France did not respond. When he annexed Austria, Britain and France did not respond. When he forced the Munich Treaty through and took the Sudetenland, Britain and France did not respond. And when he took the rest of Czechoslovakia, Britain and France did not respond.

Why would he believe that Britain and France were going to fight for Poland? Why? Miscalculation. I worry that unless we do not continue to indicate in the most robust terms possible that we will defend our allies, that we will not allow a conventional attack or the threat of escalation to make invasion an accomplished fact, or that we will not allow gray warfare to subvert our national wills, or send little green men into Poland or Latvia or Lithuania, I worry that there will be miscalculation in the Kremlin that could cause a decision that misreads our willingness to defend our allies.

It is those things that I would focus on rather than the numbers of Russian

warheads. As long as we modernize our force, as long as we have strategic systems that we are confident in their performance, and therefore any potential enemy has to be confident in their performance, I think we're going to be fine. We just need to get the Congress to keep funding it and we need to keep building those systems.

(Applause).

MR. HUESSY: All of you have a wonderful Memorial Day weekend. Be safe and be well.

Sir, thank you.