#### **MITCHELL INSTITUTE** for Aerospace Studies



# Small Satellites: Answering the Call for Space Superiority

Charles Galbreath Senior Fellow For Space Studies with Aidan Poling Senior Research Analyst




- To address Russian and Chinese offensive objectives in space, the United States Space Force must gain and maintain space superiority—achieved through tenets of Competitive Endurance
- Small satellites, or "SmallSats," already supporting Competitive Endurance to increase resiliency, can play a much larger role across all three tenets—Deny First Mover Advantage, Avoid Operational Surprise, and Conduct Responsible Counterspace Campaigning
- Employing SmallSats enables rapid reconstitution of lost/degraded capabilities, use of defensive measures such as camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD), greatly expanding sensor distribution, and hosting a range of defensive and offensive weapons
- The changes that SmallSats represent to satellite procurement and employment must drive a shift in thinking about how the USSF fields and operates its space architecture

Without consistent funding and proper authorities, the Space Force can't fully utilize SmallSats




## SmallSat Compared to Legacy Satellites





### A Small History


- SmallSats have been an integral element of space operations since the beginning of the Space Age
- Over the past 65 years, SmallSats remained the platform of choice for scientific payload, experiments, and even some demonstrations and prototypes
- The high-stakes implications of the Cold War and available technology drove satellites performing intelligence, missile warning, and nuclear command, control, and communications missions to larger, more reliable platforms
- This resulted in the deployment of small numbers of exquisite, highly capable, long-lived satellites
- After the Cold War, assumptions of space as a sanctuary maintained the existing paradigm of large operational systems for several decades



Technician lowering Explorer 1 satellite payload onto launch vehicle, January 1958 (<u>https://explorer1.jpl.nasa.gov/galleries/explor</u> <u>er-1/#gallery-4</u>)




# Legacy Space Development Cycle





#### Increasing Threats

- To counter U.S. Space Systems
  - Since Desert Storm, China undertook a campaign to erase the asymmetric advantage space capabilities afforded U.S. and Allied forces
- To use space to target U.S. and Allied forces
  - In the past decade, China has fielded space capabilities at a "breakout pace" to extend its power projection capability




For more on the growing threat, check out: <u>Building USSF Counterspace Capabilities—An Imperative</u> for America's Defense and the <u>Schriever Spacepower Series with Maj Gen Gregory J. Gagnon</u>




## Increasing Opportunities

- Increasing capacity and capability of digital technology coupled with lower launch costs and increasing launch opportunities have made SmallSats <u>operationally</u> viable
- Long Duration Propulsive ESPA (LDPA), Starlink, and the Proliferated Warfighting Space Architecture (PWSA) are proving the utility of SmallSats








Operational SmallSats come at the opportune time to move away from "big, fat, juicy targets"



## SmallSat Development Cycle



SmallSats can be as transformative for space activities as assembly lines were to the Industrial Revolution



#### Competitive Endurance and Need for Space Superiority

- In competition or conflict, the United States must have the ability to gain and maintain space superiority
- Assuring the advantages of space is a critical element of integrated deterrence
- The theory of Competitive Endurance identifies three lines of effort needed to secure a space advantage and promote stability
- Blue Space Capability capabilities (Favors China) (Favors China) Non-Mission Capable **Fully Mission Capable** Red Space Capability -
- Deny First-Mover Advantage seeks to decrease the incentive to a potential adversary from taking the first offensive action
- Avoid Operational Surprise creates a clear understanding of potential threats to friendly space capabilities, regardless of domain origin
- Conduct Responsible Counterspace Campaigning will protect friendly space capabilities and defend fielded air, land, and maritime forces from adversary space-enabled attack

Both sides can use

space capabilities

(Very High Risk to

the Joint Force)

**Red Superiority** 

**Blue Space** 

Superiority

(Favors U.S.)

Neither side can

use space



- Continue proliferation activities already underway
- Utilize camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD) techniques
  - Expand on the inherent advantage of being a smaller target to further decrease an adversary's ability to find, fix, and track
  - Employ low-reflectivity materials and paints to reduce signature
  - Deploy SmallSats in clusters to obfuscate missions
- Deploy multi-orbit diversified architecture
  - Leverage the affordability and versatility of SmallSats to further improve mission assurance
  - Deploy SmallSats to a mix of LEO, MEO, GEO, xGEO, and others to support the same mission
- Advance use of rapidly deployable SmallSats to augment and/or reconstitute existing capabilities



## SmallSats to Avoid Operational Suprise

- Expand space domain sensing architecture
  - SmallSats can affordably proliferate space domain awareness sensors to cover greater volumes of space and in key regions
  - Victus Nox and Victus Haze are proving the potential to rapidly deploy sensors to respond to emerging threats
- Expand the ability to monitor air, land, and maritime threats
  - SmallSats can provide ubiquitous coverage of the Earth to monitor air, land, and maritime threats to space capabilities








SmallSats to Conduct Responsible Counterspace Campaigning

- Deploy bodyguard and hunter-killer SmallSats
  - Proposed in 1996's "Air Force 2025"
  - Current technology and threat make this concept acutely relevant
  - SmallSats could leverage a range of temporary or permanent counterspace payloads supporting defensive/offensive missions
- SmallSats could deploy with larger satellites to maintain awareness and respond to threats to high-value assets



 SmallSats could patrol key orbits or follow adversary satellites to enable options for future leaders

SmallSats can create dilemmas for a potential adversary and support our deterrent posture



## Improving Adoption of SmallSats (1 of 2)

- Acquisition
  - Large block buys of highly versatile buses
  - Secured/stable funding for multiple generations of a system
  - Increase funding tied to Competitive Endurance
  - Support Industrial Base adjustments to SmallSat production
  - Continue to develop and scale launch capabilities and capacity







# Improving Adoption of SmallSats (2 of 2)

- Operations
  - Develop/adopt tactics, techniques, and procedures tailored for operations of large numbers of SmallSats
  - Increase cyber awareness and defenses
  - Improve satellite tracking precision
- Sustainment
  - Prioritize architecture sustainability
  - Assure supply chain reliability and depth
  - Make management, disposal, and reconstitution part of the strategy—non-LEO SmallSats may require servicing to extend operational life or aid in disposal



Decision-makers must understand the full potential of SmallSats as well as their limitations



- SmallSats have long been an integral part of space activities
- Lower launch costs and digital technology now make SmallSats operationally relevant to address increasing threats
- SmallSats can support all tenets of Competitive Endurance and help deliver space superiority
  - Uniquely enable reconstitution; augmentation; camouflage, concealment, and deception; diversification, proliferation; and defensive operations
- Low cost and rapid timelines make SmallSats a highly flexible and scalable tool to create dilemmas for an adversary
- Adjustments to space acquisition, operations, and sustainment can further advance the adoption of SmallSats

Consistent funding and proper authorities will be critical to realize the full benefits of SmallSats





#### www.mitchellaerospacepower.org