PLA Sprint To Nuclear Superiority: A New Existential Threat



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For the Air Force Association's Mitchell Institute *Nuclear Deterrence Forum*,
August 5, 2021

8/5/21, Mitchell Institute Nuclear Deterrence Forum, Rick Fisher, IASC

Pre Buildup Missile/Warhead Estimates

DoD Report 9/2020: "100" ICBMs;

Chart numbers are estimates, not counting DF-4.

DIA Director Lt. Gen. Robert J. Ashley,

May 31, 2019: "Over the next

decade, China will likely at least double

the size of its nuclear stockpile..."

100 ICBMs; DoD Count; + SLBMs; Missiles vs. Warheads		
ICBM	Missiles in a Brigade	Warheads per ICBM/Total
DF-5A	10	1/10
DF-5B	10	3/30
DF-31A	24	1/24
DF-31AG	24	1/24
DF-41	24	6-10/144-240
Totals	100 (DoD 2019)	232-328
SLBMs:		
JL-2; 4x Type 094 x 12	48	1/48
JL-3; 2x Type 094A	24	1-6/24-144
Total ICBM + SLBM	172	304-520 warheads

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Buildup Indicators

1970s to ??: Tunnel Construction; estimated 3,000km by early 2010s.

Road/Rail Mobile ICBMs: DF-31A (2007), DF-31AG (2015), DF-41 (2017—MIRV), DF-41X (202X--Rail Mobile).

SSBNs: Early 2000s, Hainan-Sanya Underground Base; 6x Type 094 by 2020, 12x SLBM; Type 096, 6x more from mid-2020s?

SLBMs: JL-2, (@2014) 7,400km range, Single Warhead; JL-3, 10,000km range; on 2x Type 094A?; up to 6x MIRV?

SILO Liquid ICBMs: @20; DF-5B, 2015, 3x MIRV; DF-5C test 1/17, 10x warheads, not reported deployed. 8x more silos?

SILO Solid ICBMs: Wuzhai DF-41 test silo, 2013-2017; Jilantai Training Area, 16 silos, 6/18 to Early 2020?; 8x new DF-5?

Yumen/Gansu 120 silos, from early 2021; Hami/Xinjiang, 110 silos, from early to mid 2021.



Chinese and Russian Warnings, One U.S. Assessment:

Hu Xijin, Editor-in-Chief, Global Times, May 8, 2020: "China needs to expand the number of its nuclear warheads to 1,000 in a relatively short time. It needs to have at least 100 Dongfeng-41 strategic missiles."

South China Morning Post, January 31, 2021: "...a source close to the Chinese military said that its stockpile of nuclear warheads had risen to 1,000 in recent years, but less than 100 of them are active."

2012, Col. Gen. Victor Esin (ret.) of Russian Rocket Forces, writes that the PLA has 1,600-1,800 warheads produced, with 800-900 "deployed."

U.S. STRATCOM Commander Admiral Charles Richard, February 2021, *Proceedings*: "China's nuclear weapons stockpile is expected to double (if not triple or quadruple) over the next <u>decade</u>."

Are PLA Deployed Warhead Levels To Exceed 3,000?



USAF Global Strike Command, Gen Timothy Ray,

June 2, 2021 Mitchell Forum: "Over the last six months we started to see changes, it's not that we saw changes, it's the number of times that assessments fell short of what they were actually accomplishing."

Reasonable Assumptions:

- 1. All silos will have ICBMs.
- 2. DF-41 can loft up to 10x warheads.
- 3. CASIC can supplement CASC ICBM production.
- 4. 6x more Type 096 SSBNs.
- 5. DF-5C 10x warhead in the 8x new DF-5 silos.

PLA Warheads: Heading To More Than 3,000??

	Minimum	Maximum warhead
	warhead estimate	estimate
Yumen, 120 silos	DF-41 6x 720	DF-41 10x 1,200
Hami, 110 silos	DF-41 6x 660	DF-41 10x 1,100
Jilantai, 16 silos	DF-41 6x 96	DF-41 10x 160
Type 096, 6x/12	JL-3 1x 72	JL-3 6x 432
SLBMs		
DF-5C, 8x new silos	DF-5C 10x 80	DF-5C 10x 80
2020 Warhead	304	520
Estimate Range		
Potential Totals,	1,932	3,483
Min/Max		

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Hypersonic Glide Vehicles: Enhancing Strategic Superiority

February 13, 2020: In testimony before the U.S. Senate, U.S. Air Force General Terrance O'Shaughnessy stated that China was testing an intercontinental range HGV weapon.

The PLA deploys one HGV weapon, the 3,000km range DF-17. HGVs can enhance the range of a missile by up to 40 percent, allowing a smaller cheaper missile to have far greater reach and effect.

On July 13, 2020, a credible poster on the popular *CJDBY* military issue web page explained future PLA ambitions to equip longer range missiles with HGVs. A version of the DF-31 armed with a HGV may be called the "DF-31B."

May 24, 2021: CCTV features graphics indicating a 10x HGV equipped warhead bus.



Seizing The High Ground For Nuclear Victory on Earth: Moon Control And Mars Control


FACT: China's space program is controlled by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). May 2018 *Kanwa Asian Defence Monthy* reported that the PLA had recently held a conference on how to militarize the Moon, describing in detail how sensors and weapons placed on the Moon would interdict in Low Earth Orbit and Deep Space.

On 31 January 2015, on the website of the CCP Central Committee's journal *Quishi* (Seeking Truth), the Chairman and CCP Party Secretary of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), Lei Fanpei, stressed that "We will adhere to the path of **developing military-civil integration** in our coming demonstration of deep space exploration, manned moon landing, heavy launch vehicle and other major programs, that are of major significance both to the nation's long-term development and to the task of building the nation into a strong space power."

After years of deception, in September 2020 a top Chinese space official confirms that China/PLA is developing a space launch vehicle and Moon landers to reach the Moon. These may allow China to put people on the Moon between 2025 and 2030. China is building an Unmanned Moon Base that could be followed by Manned Moon Base building after 2030. China and its Moon partner, Russia, are concentrating on building their presence on the Moon's South Pole, the best location for finding water-ice.

China Daily, November 26, 2020, stated, "China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp [CASC] has estimated that about 10 Long March 9s will be needed each year from 2030 to 2035 in China to serve the nation's robust demand for heavy-lift rockets." So, 60x LM-9s, 50 to 60 tons to the Moon; just 40 LM-9s might build up to 10x Moon Bases.

From the Moon, China can exert control over Cis-Lunar space and Lagrangian Points, and possibly deny access to the Space Economy while dominating the Earth-Moon system. China may be planning manned Mars missions in 2033, 2035, 2037 and 2041, as revealed at GLEX conference in Moscow on June 15, 2021.



Will China And Russia Begin Joint Nuclear Coercion And Warfighting?


The new China-Russia Entente is fraught with instabilities, but Russia is certainly capable of bandwagoning with a winner if convinced of the inevitability of CCP hegemony.

Russia-China cooperation in missile defense and "strategic defense" over the last decade should prompt a logical question: are China and Russia also engaging in "strategic offense" cooperation?

Would Russia make its expanded nuclear arsenal available to China for missions of nuclear coercion or even warfighting?

Does Russian conventional military signaling regarding Taiwan underscore the danger of joint nuclear cooperation?

Would China assess that a joint nuclear mobilization with Russia may be sufficient to "deter" the U.S. from defending Taiwan,





New Era CCP-PLA Nuclear Posture

- 1. End of CCP/PLA Deception/Political Credibility: There is no need to give credibility to the CCP after its decades of sophisticated deception. Stated policies of "nuclear capabilities at a minimum," "nuclear strategy of self defense," "does not engage in nuclear arms race," and "no first use," were offered to buy the decades needed to build toward nuclear superiority. Corollary: From any position of weakness, successful arms control with China requires acceptance of CCP goals and your strategic subordination.
- 2. PLA Nuclear Posture Flows From CCP Strategic Goals: The CCP seeks eventual global hegemony, to be the paramount global power and primary determinant of global priorities/rules. To achieve this it requires the most powerful navy, air forces, space forces and the most powerful Nuclear Forces. Corollary: Any suggestions that China's new nuclear buildup is a response to U.S. actions is delusion and a set-up to justify defeatist policies.
- 3. New Era Of CCP/PLA Nuclear Coercion Is Here: Occasional nuclear threats from Chinese military or diplomatic officials is not new but the CCP is losing its "fear" of the United States. As PLA growing conventional power has provided the CCP license to engage in overt military coercion, such as against Taiwan, so too will new PLA nuclear power enable nuclear coercion, or virtual nuclear terrorism. Early July 2021 Chinese video from military web page: "When we liberate Taiwan, if Japan dares to intervene by force... We will use nuclear bombs first. We will use nuclear bombs continuously until Japan declares unconditional surrender for the second time." Expect greater near-term use of nuclear coercion against U.S. support for Taiwan. Chinese state media following the "revealing" makes clear China intends to use its nuclear force to compel U.S. behavior, not just deter U.S. attack.

Policy Issues As The PLA Sprints To Nuclear Superiority

- 1. When will the leadership of the United States publicly explain these new existential threats?
- 2. As the PLA sprints to nuclear superiority, possibly allying with Russia for nuclear coercion or worse, is it time for the U.S. to get out of New START and signal to Beijing and Moscow that the U.S. will not be overwhelmed and blackmailed?
- 3. Is this a time that requires Re-MIRVing and new missiles in "a buildup in order to build down"?
- 4. Given the potential for a combined China-Russia threat, is it time to end restrictions on U.S. missile defense and to reinvest in nuclear civil defense?

